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Zusammenfassung
Im Artikel in Modul 1 wird ein umfangreicher Datensatz mit Jahresabschluss- und Ausfal-
linformationen deutscher, mittelsta¨ndischer Unternehmen analysiert. Diese Daten, welche
als typisch fu¨r ein Firmenkreditportfolio einer Großbank zu sehen sind, werden als Basis ge-
nutzt, um ein firmenspezifisches Verlustprognosemodell zu entwickeln. Unter Verwendung
dieses Modells ko¨nnen signifikante firmenspezifische und makroo¨konomische Risikotreiber
identifiziert und Ausfallrisiken u¨ber einen Mehrjahreshorizont prognostiziert werden. U¨ber
das zeitspezifische Verhalten der ermittelten Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten werden mehrperi-
odige Portfolioverlustverteilungen fu¨r bankspezifische Kreditportfolien gescha¨tzt. Die Ana-
lysen basieren auf einem Datensatz aus 5.930 deutschen, mittelsta¨ndischen Unternehmen.
Zu diesen Unternehmen werden u¨ber einen Zeitraum von 2002 bis 2007 insgesamt u¨ber
23.000 Jahresabschlu¨sse analysiert. Die Ergebnisse ko¨nnen als Grundlage zur Entwicklung
von Handlungsstrategien dienen, um Kreditportfolioverluste u¨ber mehrere Perioden rea-
listischer bewerten zu ko¨nnen.
Im Artikel in Modul 2 wird die Heilung von ausgefallenen Unternehmen analysiert und
es werden beobachtbare Heilungsereignisse in die Ausfallprognose von kleinen und mittle-
ren Unternehmen integriert. Aufgrund der zusa¨tzlichen heilungsspezifischen Informationen
wird ein neues Informationsset genutzt, um individuelle Ausfall- und Heilungsereignisse
vorauszusagen. Dies ist ein neuer Ansatz innerhalb der Kreditrisikoanalyse, welcher unserer
Meinung nach bislang nicht verfolgt wurde. Es werden unterschiedliche firmenspezifische
und makroo¨konomische Ausfall- und Heilungsereignis beeinflussende Risikotreiber iden-
tifiziert. Die Scha¨tzungen werden mittels des firmenspezifischen Datensatzes entwickelt.
Aufgrund des signifikanten Einflusses auf das Ausfallrisiko sowie die Ertragserwartung der
Bank bezu¨glich eines geheilten Unternehmens scheint es elementar fu¨r das Risikomanage-
ment diese zusa¨tzlichen Informationen in die Kreditrisikoanalyse zu integrieren.
Im Artikel in Modul 3 wird die Belastbarkeit der Kundenbeziehung zwischen einer kredit-
gebenden Bank und ihren Kreditnehmern, bestehend aus kleinen und mittleren Unterneh-
men, in einer Stresssituation analysiert. Wir fokussieren uns auf Firmen eines Kreditport-
folios, welche einen Ausfallgrund aufweisen und untersuchen den Einfluss unterschiedlicher
qualitativer und quantitativer Faktoren auf die Ku¨ndigungswahrscheinlichkeit der Kun-
denbeziehung. Die Ergebnisse werden auf Basis des firmenspezifischen Datensatzes entwi-
ckelt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine Bank ho¨chstwahrscheinlich die Kreditbeziehung
ku¨ndigen wird, wenn sie u¨berzeugt ist, dass es keinerlei Zahlungen bezu¨glich des Kredites
geben wird. Ist die Zahlung dagegen lediglich einige Zeit verzo¨gert, ist eine Ku¨ndigung
wenig wahrscheinlich. Daru¨ber hinaus stabilisiert ein großer Einbezug der Gesellschafter
des Unternehmens, gemessen an der Eigenkapitalquote, die Kundenbeziehung nachhaltig.
In makroo¨konomischer Hinsicht haben ein geringes Zinsniveau sowie ein wirtschaftlicher
Aufschwung stabilisierenden Einfluss auf die Kundenbeziehung.
Abstract
The paper in module I evaluates a large database consisting of financial statements and
default information regarding German small- and medium-sized firms. The databank can
be seen as a typical major bank SME credit-portfolio. The data is applied in order to
develop a firm specific loss-prediction model. The model identifies significant firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk-drivers and allows multi-period loss-predictions. Based on the
individual time-specific behavior of the determined default-probabilities, a multi-period
loss-prediction regarding a bank-specific credit portfolio is estimated. The databank con-
sists of 5,930 German SME with information from over 23,000 financial statements from
January 2002 to December 2007. The findings can be applied as a basis for the develop-
ment of strategies in order to evaluate multi-period credit-portfolio risk more realistic.
The paper in module II evaluates the resurrection event regarding defaulted firms and
incorporates observable cure events in the default prediction of SME. Due to the additio-
nal cure-related observable data, a completely new information set is applied to predict
individual default and cure events. This is a new approach in credit risk that, to our know-
ledge, has not been followed yet. Different firm-specific and macroeconomic default and
cure-event-influencing risk drivers are identified. The estimations are developed based on
the firm-specific database. Due to the significant influence on the default risk probability
as well as the bank’s possible profit prospects concerning a cured firm, it seems essential
for the risk management to incorporate the additional cure information into the credit risk
evaluation.
The paper in module III evaluates the resilience of the relationship between a lending bank
and its SME borrowers in a stressed situation. We focus on firms in a credit portfolio which
triggered a default event and investigate the interdependencies between the cancelation of
the relationship and different qualitative and quantitative influence factors. The findings
are developed based on the firm-specific database. We find that the relationship is most
likely canceled if the bank is convinced that it will not get paid any more regarding its
outstanding loans. On the other hand, if the payment is only delayed for some time, a
cancelation of the relationship is less likely. Furthermore, the commitment of the firm’s
owner, measured in the equity quote, seems to be essential for the robustness of the rela-
tionship. Also macroeconomic influence factors are identified. A low interest rate and an
economic upturn are in general a relationship-supporting environment.
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Zusammenfassung
1 Motivation
Die vergangenen Jahre der Finanzmarkt- und Schuldenkrise haben eindrucksvoll
gezeigt, wie wichtig es fu¨r Finanzinstitute ist, Kreditportfolien hinsichtlich ihrer
Risikostruktur realita¨tsnah beurteilen zu ko¨nnen. Das richtige Management von
Kreditportfolien durch genaue Identifikation und Prognose von Verlustrisiken kann
u¨berlebenswichtig sein fu¨r Banken und hat somit weitreichende o¨konomische Rele-
vanz. Entsprechend umfangreich sind die Forschungsansa¨tze im Bereich der Kredit-
risikoanalyse, siehe hierzu beispielsweise Altman und Saunders (1997), Jarrow und
Turnbull (2000), Bluhm et al. (2003) oder Albrecht (2005).
Die verwendeten Modelle erstrecken sich inzwischen von der Scoring-basierten Ana-
lyse eines einzelnen Schuldners, siehe Altman (1968) und Ohlson (1980), bis hin
zu umfangreichen Kreditportfoliomodellen, welche auf den Ansa¨tzen der strukturel-
len Modelle oder der Reduktionsmodelle basieren, siehe Merton (1974, 1977), Black
und Scholes (1973), Jarrow und Turnbull (1995), Jarrow et al. (1997) sowie Hillegeist
et al. (2004). Zudem sind in den vergangenen Jahren auch komplexe Modelle zur
Prognose mehrja¨hriger Kreditrisiken entstanden, siehe Hamerle et al. (2007), Duffie
et al. (2007) und Duffie et al. (2009).
Der u¨berwiegende Teil der Forschung befasst sich mit dem angloamerikanischen
Raum und stu¨tzt sich bei der Modellentwicklung auf eine Datenbasis bestehend aus
bo¨rsengehandelten Firmenanleihen beziehungsweise Finanzdaten US-amerikanischer
Unternehmen, welche ha¨ufig bo¨rsennotiert sind und deren Informationspolitk ent-
sprechend umfangreich ist, siehe Hillegeist et al. (2004), Das et al. (2007) oder
Duffie et al. (2009). Hierbei stellt sich die Frage, ob sich diese Modelle reibungs-
los auf Kreditportfolien mit Schuldnern aus dem deutschen Mittelstand adaptieren
lassen, oder ob es hier nicht auch eigene, wichtige Zusammenha¨nge unterschiedli-
cher Risikotreiber zu beachten gilt. Diese Frage ist fu¨r alle Banken von elementarer
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Bedeutung, welche Kreditportfolien bestehend aus deutschen Mittelsta¨ndlern be-
sitzen, da bei einer kritiklosen U¨bernahme der auf US-amerikanischen Daten be-
ruhenden Modelle bestimmte Portfoliorisiken gegebenenfalls nicht korrekt abgebil-
det werden. Hierdurch ko¨nnten die jeweiligen Kreditinstitute, je nach Prognose, zu
viel eigene Mittel fu¨r das Kreditportfoliorisiko binden oder, im anderen Extrem-
fall, relevante Ausfallrisiken nicht genu¨gend absichern. Insbesondere im traditionell
verschwiegenen deutschen Mittelstand stellt die Erarbeitung von passenden Risiko-
modellen eine Herausforderung da. Der deutsche Mittelstand, welcher u¨berwiegend
aus familiengefu¨hrten Unternehmen besteht, ist seit jeher relativ zuru¨ckhaltend
bezu¨glich finanzspezifischer Informationen. Die externe Finanzierung erfolgt nicht
durch Bo¨rsennotierungen sondern prima¨r durch Bankkredite, wodurch o¨ffentliche
Publizita¨tspflichten grundsa¨tzlich entfallen. Folglich ist die Datenbasis, welche als
Grundlage fu¨r Risikomodelle, die sich auf ein Portfolio aus Schuldnern des deutschen
Mittelstandes beziehen, dienen kann, entsprechend begrenzt, siehe Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2010). Zudem sind Ausfallereignisse relativ selten. Kaiser und Szczesny (2003)
und Hamerle et al. (2007) haben sich der Risikoanalyse mittelsta¨ndischer Unterneh-
men gewidmet und hierbei auf o¨ffentlich zuga¨ngliche Daten zuru¨ckgegriffen, welche
die jeweiligen Unternehmen freiwillig zur Verfu¨gung gestellt haben. Bei freiwillig zur
Verfu¨gung gestellten Daten wird jedoch, insbesondere bei den informationspolitisch
zuru¨ckhaltenden deutschen Unternehmen, nur ein ausgesuchter Teil des gesamten
deutschen Mittelstandes analysiert.
Diese Arbeit nutzt eine umfangreiche Datenbasis mit einer Fu¨lle an Informationen
u¨ber den kompletten Querschnitt des deutschen Mittelstandes. Der Datensatz wurde
von der Dresdner Bank AG im Fru¨hjahr 2008 zur Verfu¨gung gestellt und beinhaltet
umfangreiche mehrja¨hrige Finanzinformationen aus u¨ber 23.000 Jahresabschlu¨ssen
von 5.930 deutschen, mittelsta¨ndischen Unternehmen. Die erfassten Daten erstre-
cken sich u¨ber einen Zeitraum von Januar 2002 bis zum Dezember 2007. Daru¨ber
hinaus sind umfangreiche Ausfalldaten zu 1.243 Unternehmen verfu¨gbar. Der Da-
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tensatz kann als ein typisches Bankportfolio aus Firmenkunden gesehen werden, da
alle Kunden erfasst wurden, deren Daten in das fu¨r die Kreditentscheidung notwen-
dige Programm eingegeben wurden. Diese Fu¨lle an Informationen zum deutschen
Mittelstand war der Wissenschaft bislang weitgehend unzuga¨nglich. Der Datensatz
dient u.A. als Basis, um das mehrperiodige Intensita¨tsmodell von Duffie et al. (2007)
direkt auf den deutschen Mittelstand anzuwenden und so ein entsprechendes Kre-
ditrisikomodell abzuleiten. Hierdurch ist es mo¨glich, eine Mehrperiodenausfallpro-
gnose, basierend auf signifikanten, firmenspezifischen und makroo¨konomischen Risi-
kotreibern, fu¨r ein Kreditportfolio aus deutschen, mittelsta¨ndischen Firmenkunden
vorzunehmen.
Das so entwickelte Kreditrisikomodell kann Banken, welche Kreditportfolien aus
deutschen Mittelsta¨ndlern haben, als Grundlage zur Entwicklung von Strategien
zur Minimierung von Portfoliorisiken dienen. Durch die realistischere Analyse der
Ausfallrisiken und die Optimierung des entsprechenen Chance-Risikoprofils ko¨nnen
Ertra¨ge im Verha¨ltnis zum Risiko maximiert werden.
Ein besonderes Ereignis im Bereich der Kreditausfallanalyse ist die Gesundung
(Cure Event) des ausgefallenen Unternehmens. Mit der Analyse von Gesundungen
bescha¨ftigt sich die Kreditriskoliteratur in den letzten Jahren zunehmend intensiver.
Hierbei werden u¨berwiegend Modelle verwendet, in denen nicht beobachtbare Cure
Events genutzt werden, um Verzerrungen bei Scha¨tzungen mit sehr vielen zensierten
Ereignissen zu vermeiden. So nutzen beispielsweise Mo und Yau (2010) und Tong
et al. (2012) diese Modellierung, um Ausfa¨lle bei Krediten im Privatkundenbereich
besser scha¨tzen zu ko¨nnen. Aber auch in der Kreditrisikoanalyse des Firmenkun-
dengescha¨ftes findet die Beru¨cksichtigung von Gesundungen in der Modellierung
zunehmend Beachtung, siehe Yildirim (2008) und Topaloglu und Yildirim (2009).
Die Nutzung von Kreditrisikomodellen, welche die Gesundung beru¨cksichtigen, ermo¨g-
licht nicht nur Vorhersagen, wann ein Schuldner ausfa¨llt, sondern auch, ob er ausfa¨llt.
Der derzeitige Einbezug nicht beobachtbarer Cure Events fu¨hrt jedoch dazu, dass die
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Modelle hinsichtlich ihrer Definition des Cure Events variieren ko¨nnen. Ein mo¨glicher
Lo¨sungsansatz ist die Beru¨cksichtigung von beobachtbaren Gesundungen, also dem
Wegfall des Ausfallgrundes ohne Verlust fu¨r die Bank. Der in dieser Arbeit ver-
wendete Datensatz beinhaltet neben den umfangreichen Finanzinformationen auch
eine Vielzahl von ausfallspezifischen Informationen. So ist etwa der weitere Verlauf
der ausgefallenen Unternehmen dokumentiert. Hierbei werden auch Gesundungen
dokumentiert. Somit ermo¨glicht die Datenbank eine explizite Analyse von beob-
achtbaren Gesundungen. Beobachtbare Cure Events werden derzeit bestenfalls in-
direkt durch die komplette Wiederherstellung des Unternehmens ohne Verlust in
der Kreditrisikoanalyse beru¨cksichtigt, siehe Calabrese und Zenga (2010). Fu¨r ei-
ne explizite Aufnahme in die Kreditrisikoanalyse sprechen mehrere Gru¨nde: Wenn
ein ausgefallenes und gesundetes Unternehmen lediglich als nicht ausgefallen gilt,
bleiben ho¨chstwahrscheinlich elementare Informationen unberu¨cksichtigt, welche bei
na¨herer Beobachtung zur Optimierung des Chance-Risikoprofils einer Bank beitra-
gen ko¨nnten. Daru¨ber hinaus bedeutet ein erfolgreicher Heilungsprozess nicht nur
keinen Verlust fu¨r die Bank, sondern ist ha¨ufig mit einem zusa¨tzlichen Ertragspo-
tential verknu¨pft. Meist sind ho¨here Kreditkonditionen vereinbart worden und das
gescha¨rfte Risikobewusstsein des Kunden du¨rfte zusa¨tzliche Potentiale, beispielswei-
se durch Absicherungsgescha¨fte bei Wa¨hrungs- oder Zinsrisiken, ero¨ffnen. Auch der
Anteil am gesamten Ertragsvolumen, welches mit einem Firmenkunden erwirtschaf-
tet wird, du¨rfte nach einer Gesundung vornehmlich auf die am Heilungsprozess aktiv
beteiligten Bankpartner aufgeteilt sein und sich nicht auf weitere, außenstehende Fi-
nanzinstitute verteilen. Zudem kennen sich die beteiligten Parteien nach einem so
einschneidenden Ereignis meist deutlich intensiver, was zu einer verbesserten Infor-
mationspolitik fu¨hren kann. Auch die professionelle Herbeifu¨hrung der Gesundung
durch Zukauf von Krediten von Unternehmen in der Restrukturierungsphase mit ent-
sprechendem Abschlag auf den Nominalbetrag bietet zusa¨tzliches Ertragspotential,
wenn eine entsprechende Expertise in einer bankinternen Restrukturierungseinheit
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vorhanden ist.
Um diese Potentiale erfassen und steuern zu ko¨nnen ist eine tiefergehende Analyse
von beobachtbaren Cure Events und deren Integration in die Verlustrisikoanaly-
se notwendig. Die ausfall- und heilungsspezifischen Informationen werden in dieser
Arbeit verwendet, um sowohl Verlustpotentiale von Kreditportfoliorisiken zu iden-
tifizieren als auch Chancenpotentiale durch die Analyse sichtbarer Cure Events zu
beru¨cksichtigen. Dies ist ein neuer Ansatz, welcher meiner Ansicht nach bislang noch
nicht analysiert worden ist. Das in dieser Arbeit entwickelten Cure After Default
Model (CADM) kann als Grundlage genutzt werden, um ein Kreditportfolio aus
deutschen, mittelsta¨ndischen Unternehmen hinsichtlich bestehender und zuku¨nftiger
Ausfallrisiken und Heilungschancen einzuscha¨tzen und zu bewerten.
Wenn die Kreditaufnahme eines Firmenkunden nicht durch kurzfristige Projektie-
rung u¨ber einen Broker abgewickelt wird, sondern mit einer engen Kundenbeziehung
zwischen Bank und Kreditnehmer einhergeht, kann dies positive Effekte fu¨r den Kre-
ditgeber wie auch den Schuldner haben. Die unterschiedlichen Aspekte dieser engen
Kreditbeziehungen werden in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur als Relationship Len-
ding bezeichnet, siehe Boot und Thakor (2000). Generell kann die Kundenbeziehung
positive Auswirkungen fu¨r beide Partner haben. Fu¨r die kreditgebende Bank ist ei-
ne enge Beziehung zwischen Bank und Kreditnehmern ha¨ufig die Basis fu¨r einen
umfassenden Informationstransfer. Der Kreditgeber ist durch den Einblick in die
finanzielle Situation des Schuldners in der Lage, einen Informationsvorsprung zu ge-
nerieren und Insiderwissen im Kreditmarkt aufzubauen, siehe Schenone (2010). Die
enge Kreditbeziehung ist ha¨ufig Ausgangsbasis fu¨r weitere Produktansa¨tze, welche
zusa¨tzliche Ertragspotentiale generieren, siehe La Torre et al. (2010). Aus einer ent-
sprechenden Informationshistorie ko¨nnen mit der Zeit zunehmend anspruchsvollere
Kreditrisikoeinscha¨tzungen einzelner Schuldner vorgenommen werden, siehe Sharpe
(1990). Fu¨r den Kreditnehmer kann durch das Rating, aber auch durch das bloße
Engagement eines Kreditinstitutes, eine positive Signalwirkung im Markt enstehen,
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siehe James (1996). Eine Vielzahl weiterer Aspekte der bestehenden Kreditbezie-
hung wie der Einfluss der Kreditbeziehung auf den Unternehmenswert oder die Ho¨he
und die Kosten der Kreditfinanzierung wurden bislang ausfu¨hrlich in der Relation-
ship Lending-Literatur evaluiert, siehe Fama (1985), Berger und Udell (1995) und
Elyasiani und Goldberg (2004).
Etwas seltener findet sich der Einfluss einer engen Kundenbeziehung auf die Situa-
tion von Unternehmen in einer finanziellen Notsituation. Dies ist vermutlich damit
zu begru¨nden, dass Ausfallereignisse bei Firmenkunden ein relativ seltenes Ereig-
nis sind und die Datengrundlage entsprechend eingeschra¨nkt ist. James (1996) und
Berlin (1996) haben in diesem Zusammenhang herausgefunden, dass eine enge Kre-
ditbeziehung zu einer Bank einen positiven Einfluss auf die Refinanzierungssituation
von Unternehmen im Restrukturierungsprozess haben kann.
Neben den harten finanziellen Informationen spielen gerade im Relationship Lending
auch die kundenspezifischen weichen Informationen eine wichtige Rolle. Insbeson-
dere diese u¨ber einen la¨ngeren Zeitraum erworbenen weichen Informationen ko¨nnen
fu¨r ein Kreditinstitut von besonderem Wert sein, siehe Berger und Udell (2002).
Die untersuchten Bereiche in der Relationship Lending-Literatur haben im Wesent-
lichen gemeinsam, dass sie Einflussfaktoren einer bestehenden Kundenbeziehung
analysieren. Die Frage, was die Kundenverbindung selbst aufrecht erha¨lt, wird hier-
bei nicht evaluiert. Dies ist bemerkenswert, da die meisten der genannten Vorteile
im Falle einer Ku¨ndigung verloren gehen wu¨rden. Somit ist die Sta¨rke und Nach-
haltigkeit der Beziehung eine elementare Voraussetzung fu¨r den Erfolg der Kun-
denbeziehung. Diese Arbeit widmet sich unter Anderem der Fragestellung, welche
qualitativen und quantitativen Einflussfaktoren eine bestehende Kundenbeziehung
sta¨rken und welche eher zu einer Aufku¨ndigung der Beziehung fu¨hren. Hierbei liegt
der Fokus nicht auf einer einvernehmlichen Ku¨ndigung beider Partner, sondern auf
der einseitigen Ku¨ndigung wa¨hrend einer Stresssituation. Eine solche Stresssituati-
on ergibt sich definitionsgema¨ß dann, wenn ein Firmenkunde fu¨r den Kreditgeber
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als ausgefallen gilt. Als Basis fu¨r die Analyse dient ein umfangreicher Datensatz
deutscher, mittelsta¨ndischer Unternehmen, welcher 144 beobachtete Ku¨ndigungen
unter 1.243 Unternehmen in Stresssituationen beinhaltet. Daru¨ber hinaus werden
weitere qualitative Informationen u¨ber den Ausfallgrund und den weiteren Verlauf
der ausgefallenen Unternehmen ausgewertet. Die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse ko¨nnen
zum besseren Versta¨ndnis beitragen, wie Banken ihre Kundenbeziehungen bewerten
und von welchen Faktoren die Robustheit der Beziehungen in Extremsituationen
abha¨ngen. Ein besseres Versta¨ndnis dieser Zusammenha¨nge kann Kreditgeber und
Kreditnehmer in die Lage versetzen, die diversen Vorteile des Relationship Lending
langfristig und auch u¨ber Krisen hinweg zu nutzen.
2 Themenu¨berblick
Die Dissertation setzt sich insgesamt aus drei einzelnen Artikeln zusammen.
Der Fokus des ersten Artikels liegt prima¨r auf der Identifikation relevanter, aus-
fallbeeinflussender Variablen sowie der Ableitung eines mehrperiodigen Verlustpro-
gnosemodells. Die Entwicklung des Modells erfolgt auf Basis eines umfangreichen
Firmenkundenportfolios, welches als repra¨sentativ fu¨r ein typisches Bankportfolio,
bestehend aus mittelsta¨ndischen, deutschen Firmenkunden, angesehen werden kann.
Es wird ein aktuelles Mehrperiodenausfallprognosemodell von Duffie et al. (2007)
auf den umfangreichen Datensatz angewendet und so ein Kreditportfoliomodell zur
Mehrperiodenverlustprognose aus den historischen Daten des Firmenkundenport-
folios abgeleitet. Insbesondere die mit 1.243 Beobachtungen relativ große Anzahl
von beobachteten Ausfallereignissen macht die Entwicklung des Ausfallprognosemo-
dells interessant. Es werden verschiedene firmenspezifische und makroo¨konomische
Ausfallrisikotreiber identifiziert, welche u¨ber einen autoregressiven Prozess erster
Ordnung in ihrer zuku¨nftigen Entwicklung beschrieben werden. Auf dieser Basis er-
folgt die Prognose der Verlustrisikokennzahlen Value at Risk, Expected Loss und
Expected Shortfall fu¨r mehrere Jahre.
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Der zweite Artikel intensiviert den Fokus auf die ausgefallenen Unternehmen in dem
Firmenkundenkreditportfolio. Hierbei wird der aktuell in der Literatur diskutierte
Bereich der Cure Events im Zusammenhang mit der Kreditrisikoanalyse beleuch-
tet. Im Gegensatz zu den u¨berwiegend mit unbeobachtbaren Cure Events arbeiten-
den Modellen in der Literatur, welche prima¨r zur Problemlo¨sung bei Datensa¨tzen
mit einer großen Anzahl von zensierten Ereignissen Verwendung finden, werden in
der vorliegenden Arbeit beobachtbare Cure Events analysiert. Beobachtbare Cure
Events werden derzeit vonehmlich indirekt u¨ber die Ru¨ckgewinnungsquote in den
Risikomodellen beru¨cksichtigt. Eine explizite Identifizierung und Einarbeitung in
die Ausfallmodellierung erscheint jedoch sinnvoll, da ein Cure Event nicht lediglich
den Wegfall des Ausfallgrundes und eine Vermeidung von Verlusten bedeutet, son-
dern sich die gesamte Chance-Risikostruktur bezu¨glich des jeweiligen Firmenkunden
a¨ndert. Wa¨hrend Ausfallrisiken durch einen intensivierten Informationsaustausch
nach einer erfolgreichen Restrukturierung eher sinken du¨rften, erho¨hen sich gleich-
zeitig diverse Ertragspotentiale, zum Beispiel durch ho¨here Margen und weiteres
Cross-Sell-Potential. Der zu Verfu¨gung gestellte Datensatz beinhaltet den Ausfall-
grund der Unternehmen sowie den weiteren Verlauf der Restrukturierung und er-
laubt somit die explizite Analyse von beobachtbaren Cure Events. Unterschiedliche
firmenspezifische und makroo¨konomische Risikotreiber werden hinichtlich ihrer Si-
gnifikanz und Einflussta¨rke auf die individuellen Heilungschancen der ausgefallenen
Unternehmen mittels eines bivariaten Probit Sample Selection Modells untersucht.
Darauf aufbauend wird ein neuartiges Kreditausfallmodell entwickelt, welches beo-
bachtbare Cure Events direkt in die Ausfallanalyse integriert: das Cure After Default
Model. Dieses Modell identifiziert firmenspezifische und makroo¨konomische Risiko-
treiber fu¨r Ausfall- und Heilungswahrscheinlichkeiten deutscher, mittelsta¨ndischer
Unternehmen.
Im dritten Artikel wird der Einfluss verschiedener qualitativer und quantitativer Ein-
flussfaktoren hinsichtlich ihrer Auswirkung auf die Stabilita¨t der Kundenbeziehung
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zwischen Bank und ausgefallenen Schuldnern analysiert. Zu den unterschiedlichen
qualitativen Einflussfaktoren za¨hlen zum Beispiel die Einscha¨tzung des Kreditgebers
hinsichtlich der Ru¨ckzahlungswahrscheinlichkeit, eine vorla¨ufige Zinslosstellung oder
ein Zahlungsverzug. Die untersuchten quantitativen Einflussfaktoren sind firmen-
spezifische Finanzinformationen aus den Jahresabschlu¨ssen der Unternehmen sowie
makroo¨konomische Gro¨ßen. Die jeweiligen Faktoren werden auf Interdependenzen
bezu¨glich der Ku¨ndigung der Gescha¨ftsbeziehung untersucht. Es wird ein Modell
gescha¨tzt, welches die Einflusssta¨rke der signifikanten Variablen im Hinblick auf die
Ku¨ndigung aufzeigt. Durch Identifikation der signifikanten Treiber werden qualitati-
ve und quantitative Rahmenbedingungen ermittelt, welche bei einer Ku¨ndigung der
Gescha¨ftsbeziehung wirken.
3 Datengrundlage
Der verwendete Datensatz beinhaltet ein Portfolio aus insgesamt 5.930 deutschen,
mittelsta¨ndischen Firmenkunden der Dresdner Bank AG1. Die Informationen wur-
den im Fru¨hjahr 2008 zur wissenschaftlichen Analyse in anonymisierter Form vom
Bereich Firmenkunden sowie der zusta¨ndigen Risikoabteilung bereitgestellt. Insge-
samt werden 23.894 Jahresabschlu¨sse fu¨r den Zeitraum vom 01.01.2002 bis zum
31.12.2007 analysiert. Das Portfolio kann als repra¨sentativ fu¨r ein bankspezifisches
Kreditportfolio angesehen werden, da die Daten keiner Vorselektion unterliegen.
Es werden alle Kunden erfasst, deren Daten in das fu¨r die Kreditentscheidung
notwendige Risikosystem eingegeben wurden. Zu den vorliegenden Informationen
za¨hlen mehrja¨hrige Finanzdaten aus der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung (GuV) und
der Bilanz sowie Informationen zur Branche und gegebenenfalls Ausfallindikatoren
mit dazugeho¨rigen Ausfallgru¨nden. Insgesamt liegen Ausfallinformationen zu 1.243
Unternehmen vor, wobei die ersten Ausfa¨lle im Jahr 2003 registriert werden. Da
1Die Dresdner Bank AG wurde im Sommer 2008 von der Commerzbank AG u¨bernommen.
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dass genutzte Risiko- und Bilanzanalysemodell im Jahreswechsel 2002/2003 initiali-
siert wurde, liegen fu¨r 2002 ausschließlich gesunde Unternehmen vor. Es werden nur
Gescha¨ftsjahre in die Analyse einbezogen, die 12 Monate umfassen. Sowohl Rumpf-
gescha¨ftsjahre als auch Ero¨ffnungsbilanzen werden nicht mit einbezogen. Die analy-
sierten Finanzinformationen basieren ausschließlich auf Einzelabschlu¨ssen. Konsoli-
dierte Zahlen wurden nicht verwendet, da der Fokus auf den Kreditgeber gerichtet
ist und allein der Eintritt eines Ausfallgrundes bereits - zumindest bu¨rokratischen -
Aufwand fu¨r die Bank bedeutet, auch wenn es sich dabei nur um ein Gruppenunter-
nehmen eines Konzerns handelt, bei dem letztendlich ein Mutterunternehmen nach
einer gewissen Zeit aushelfen ko¨nnte. Die drei wesentlichen Informationsbereiche
des Datensatzes der mittelsta¨ndischen Unternehmen - Finanzdaten, Branchenin-
formationen und Ausfallinformationen - werden in den nachfolgenden Abschnitten
erla¨utert.
3.1 Finanzdaten
Die Jahresabschlussdaten des Datensatzes beinhalten folgende Finanzinformationen:
Umsatz, EBITDA2, EBITA3, Bruttoergebnis, Nettoergebnis, kurzfristiges Fremdka-
pital, langfristiges Fremdkapital, langfristige Ru¨ckstellungen, Eigenkapital, Anlage-
vermo¨gen sowie Umlaufvermo¨gen.
In der nachfolgenden Tabelle 1 werden deskriptive Statistiken, welche die firmen-
spezifischen Variablen des Datensatzes veranschaulichen, dargestellt. In der Tabel-
le wird die durchschnittliche Ho¨he der einzelnen Werte u¨ber die sechs Jahre des
gesamten Beobachtungszeitraums hinweg dargestellt. Die Daten beziehen sich auf
Durchschnittswerte fu¨r jedes der insgesamt im Zeitablauf untersuchten 5.930 Un-
ternehmen. Es wird das arithmetische Mittel, der Median sowie das 25%- und das
2Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; auf deutsch: Ergebnis vor
Zinsen, Steuern, Abschreibungen auf Sachanlagen und Amortisation von immateriellen Wirt-
schaftsgu¨tern.
3Earnings before interest, taxes and amortization; auf deutsch: Ergebnis vor Zinsen, Steuern
und Amortisation von immateriellen Wirtschaftsgu¨tern.
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Tabelle 1: Durchschnittswerte der beobachteten Variablen bezu¨glich aller Firmen u¨ber
den Gesamtbetrachtungszeitraum von 2002 bis 2007 in tausend Euro (N = 5.930, Anzahl
der beobachteten Firmen innerhalb des Gesamtbetrachtungszeitraum).
Variable Arithm. Mittel 25%-Quantil Median 75%-Quantil
Umsatz 93.311 2.870 12.667 36.867
EBITDA 4.421 77 571 2.141
EBITA 2.222 -13 261 1.230
Bruttoergebnis 4.124 4 282 1.524
Nettoergebnis 1.461 0 145 882
Kurzfristiges Fremdkapital 35.890 1.522 4.338 12.314
Langfristiges Fremdkapital 11.625 12 731 3.436
Langfristige Ru¨ckstellungen 6.663 0 91 853
Eigenkapital 23.142 214 1.369 5.840
Anlagevermo¨gen 38.225 434 2.371 9.698
Umlaufvermo¨gen 38.349 1.372 4.711 14.132
75%-Quantil der jeweiligen Variablen veranschaulicht.
Der Median des Umsatzes der Unternehmen liegt im Durchschnitt der Jahre bei
rund 13 Mio. Euro, das 25%-Quantil liegt bei 3 Mio. Euro und das 75%-Quantil bei
37 Mio. Euro. Nach der umsatzspezifischen Definition des statistischen Bundesamtes
geho¨ren die betrachteten Firmen somit durchschnittlich zum Bereich der kleinen und
mittleren Unternehmen (KMU) der deutschen Wirtschaft. 4 Der Median des EBIT-
DA liegt bei rund 0,6 Mio. Euro bei einem Wert von rund 0,08 Mio. im 25%-Quantil
und 2,1 Mio. Euro im 75%-Quantil. Eine a¨hnliche Spannweite ist beim EBITA zu er-
kennen. Hier liegt der Median bei 0,26 Mio. Euro, wobei das 75%-Quantil einen Wert
von 1,2 Mio. Euro aufweist und im 25%-Quantil ein negativer Wert von -13 Tsd. Euro
zu erkennen ist. Setzt man, bezogen auf den jeweiligen Median, das Bruttoergebnis
ins Verha¨ltnis zum Umsatz so ist eine Rendite von durchschnittlich 2,2% festzu-
stellen. Der Median des kurzfristigen Fremdkapitals liegt im Durchschnitt bei etwa
4,3 Mio. Euro. Beim langfristigen Fremdkapital liegt der Median deutlich niedriger
bei 731 Tsd. Euro. Der Median der langfristigen Ru¨ckstellungen liegt bei 91 Tsd.
Euro. Auffa¨llig ist weiterhin, dass u¨ber 25% der Unternehmen in den betrachteten
4Umsatzdefiniton KMU: 2 bis 50 millionen Euro.
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Jahren langfristige Ru¨ckstellungen von 0 Euro aufweisen. Sowohl das arithmetische
Mittel des Anlagevermo¨gens als auch das des Umlaufvermo¨gen liegen beide bei rund
38 Mio. Euro. Die Unterschiede werden bei der Betrachtung des Medians deutlich.
Der Median des Anlagevermo¨gens ist mit 2,37 Mio. Euro im Durchschnitt u¨ber die
einzelnen Jahre rund halb so hoch wie der des Umlaufvermo¨gens mit etwa 4,71 Mio.
Euro.
3.2 Branchendaten
Die unterschiedlichen Branchen sind in Hauptbranchen und Unterbranchen unter-
teilbar. Die Gliederung der Branchen entspricht dem Schema des Statistischen Bun-
desamtes. Die 5.930 Unternehmen des Datensatzes lassen sich insgesamt in 851 Bran-
chen und Unterbranchen aufteilen. Um die Interpretation zu vereinfachen, wurden
die Unterbranchen auf die jeweiligen Hauptbranchen konsolidiert. Hierdurch redu-
ziert sich die Anzahl der Branchen auf 56. Diese Branchen sind, zusammen mit der
Anzahl der dazugeho¨rigen Unternehmen, mit abnehmender Firmenanzahl in Ta-
belle 2 dargestellt. Die mit 1.125 Firmen gro¨ßte Anzahl an Unternehmen kommt
in der Branche Handelsvermittlung und Großhandel vor. Diese Branche beinhal-
tet unter anderem Großhandel von Nahrungsmitteln, Getra¨nken, Maschinen, Bau-
stoffen, Textilien, pharmazeutischen, medizinischen und orthopa¨dischen Erzeugnis-
sen, Mineralo¨lerzeugnissen, Erzen und Metallen sowie chemischen Erzeugnissen. Am
zweitha¨ufigsten sind Unternehmen der Branche Erbringung von wirtschaftlichen
Dienstleistungen vertreten. Die 611 Unternehmen dieser Branche verteilen sich auf
Unterbranchen wie zum Beispiel Architektur- und Ingenieurbu¨ros, Werbung, Mana-
gement von Holdinggesellschaften, Unternehmensberatung sowie Wach- und Sicher-
heitsdienste. Mehr als die Ha¨lfte der Unternehmen sind in den ersten sechs Branchen
Handelsvermittlung und Großhandel, Erbringung von wirtschaftlichen Dienstleis-
tungen, Maschinenbau, Grundstu¨cks- und Wohnungswesen, Herstellung von Metall-
erzeugnissen und Baugewerbe ta¨tig.
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Tabelle 2: Konsolidierte Branchen der Unternehmen aus der Datenbank mit der Anzahl
an vorkommenden Firmen. Dargestellt in absteigender Anzahl der Unternehmen.
Branche Firmenanzahl
Handelsvermittlung und Großhandel 1.125
Erbringung von wirtschaftl. Dienstleitungen 611
Maschinenbau (inkl. Wartung, Reparatur) 457
Grundstu¨cks- und Wohnungswesen 448
Hv Metallerzeugnissen 239
Baugewerbe 234
Kraftfahrzeughandel, Instandhaltung und Reparatur von KFZ, Tankstellen 211
Einzelhandel 201
Hilfs- und Nebenta¨tigkeiten fu¨r Verkehr und Verkehrsvermittlung 178
Hv chemischen Erzeugnissen 173
Erna¨hrungsgewerbe 156
Hv Gummi- und Kunststoffwaren 146
Metallerzeugung und -bearbeitung 122
Hv Kraftwagen und Kraftwagenteilen 114
Hv Medizin-, Mess-, Steuer- und Regelungstechnik, Optik, Uhren 112
Glasgewerbe, Hv Keramik, Verarbeitung von Steinen und Erden 94
Schifffahrt 92
Hv Gera¨ten zur Elektrizita¨tserzeugung, -verteilung 90
Verlagsgewerbe, Druckgewerbe, Vervielfa¨ltigung von bespielten Bild-, Ton- und Da-
tentra¨gern
85
Datenverarbeitung und Datenbanken 82
Papiergewerbe 78
Hv Mo¨beln, Schmuck, Musikinstrumenten, Sportgera¨ten, Spielwaren 77
Gesundheits-, Verterina¨r- und Sozialwesen 74
Elektrizita¨ts- und Gasversorgung 69
Textilgewerbe 61
Kultur, Sport und Unterhaltung 57
Hv Rundfunk- und Nachrichtentechnik 49
Abwasser- und Abfallbeseitigung 43
Erbringung von sonstigen Dienstleistungen 42
Fortsetzung auf der na¨chsten Seite
13
Tabelle 2: Konsolidierte Branchen der Unternehmen aus der Datenbank mit der Anzahl
an vorkommenden Firmen. Dargestellt in absteigender Anzahl der Unternehmen. Forts.
Branche Firmenanzahl
Sonstiger Fahrzeugbau 38
Holzgewerbe (ohne Hv Mo¨beln) 36
Vermietung beweglicher Sachen ohne Bedienungspersonal 34
Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden, sonstiger Bergbau 33
Bekleidungsgewerbe 26
Landverkehr 26
Gastgewerbe 25
Erziehung und Unterricht 25
Banken, Finanzdienstleistungen 23
Recycling 21
Interessenvertretungen sowie kirchliche und sonst. Vereinigungen (ohne Sozialwesen,
Kultur)
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Nachrichtenu¨bermittlung, Post, Telefon, Rundfunk, Fernsehen 17
Hv Leder, Lerderwaren, Schuhe 14
Landwirtschaft und Jagd 13
Hv Bu¨romaschinen, Datenverarbeitungsgera¨ten und -einrichtungen 12
Mit Kredit- oder Versicherungswesen verbundene Ta¨tigkeiten 12
Kokerei, Mineralo¨lverarbeitung 8
Wasserversorgung 6
Tabakverarbeitung 5
Kohlenbergbau und Torfgewinnung 3
Luftfahrt 3
Forschung und Entwicklung 3
Privatpersonen 3
Gewinnung von Erdo¨l und Erdgas 2
Forstwirtschaft 1
Versicherungsgewerbe 1
Gesetzliche Sozialversicherung und Arbeitsfo¨rderung 1
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3.3 Ausfalldaten
Von den 5.930 Unternehmen in der Datenbank fallen im Gesamtbetrachtungszeit-
raum von Januar 2002 bis Dezember 2007 insgesamt 1.243 aus. Als ausgefallen gilt
ein Unternehmen, welches mindestens einen Ausfallgrund aufweist. Ausfallgru¨nde
sind beispielsweise 90 Tage Zahlungsverzug, Abschreibungen oder Insolvenz. Fu¨r das
Jahr 2002 sind nur nicht ausgefallene Unternehmen vorhanden. Die ersten Ausfa¨lle
werden im Jahr 2003 registriert, da das Risikosystem aus dem die Daten stammen
erst gegen Ende des Jahres 2002 aktiviert wurde. Es sind 2.779 Jahresabschlu¨sse
von ausgefallenen Unternehmen verfu¨gbar. Dies bedeutet, dass im Durchschnitt 2,2
Jahre an Jahresabschlussdaten zur Verfu¨gung stehen. Bei den 4.687 nicht ausgefal-
lenen Firmen sind im Durchschnitt Finanzdaten fu¨r 4,5 Jahre vorhanden. Daru¨ber
hinaus sind Informationen u¨ber die weitere Entwicklung nach dem Ausfall vorhan-
den. Hierbei wird zwischen fu¨nf verschiedenen Auspra¨gungen unterschieden: Cured
bedeutet, dass der Ausfallgrund ohne Verlust fu¨r die Bank entfallen ist. Write-off
bedeutet, dass ein Teil oder das Gesamtengagement abgeschrieben wurde. Worked-
out bedeutet, dass die Kreditlinie gestrichen wurde und die Sicherheitenverwertung
eingetreten ist. Distressed-sold bedeutet, dass das Kreditengagement mit Verlust
verkauft wurde. Die fu¨nfte Auspra¨gung lautet Unknown, was bedeutet, dass die
weitere Entwicklung nach dem Ausfall nicht bekannt ist. Insgesamt kommen 333
Firmen mit Cured vor, 269 mit Write-off, 244 mit Unknown, 239 mit Worked-out
und bei 158 ist die Entwicklung Distressed-sold genannt. Die genannten Ausfallin-
formationen werden in Tabelle 3 veranschaulicht.
Zu den verfu¨gbaren Ausfallinformationen za¨hlen auch die Ausfallgru¨nde. Hierbei
sind Mehrfachnennungen durchaus die Regel. In Tabelle 4 sind die untersuchten
Ausfallgru¨nde mit der jeweiligen Anzahl an Nennungen aufgefu¨hrt.
Die Bezeichnung Free-of-interest-state bedeutet, dass das Unternehmen keine fa¨lligen
Zinsen fu¨r ausstehende Kreditlinien zahlt. Payment-unlikely ist kein hartes Krite-
rium, sondern eher eine Einscha¨tzung des Gla¨ubigers, dass eine bestimmte Zah-
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Tabelle 3: Auspra¨gungen der unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen.
Auspra¨gung Anzahl der Unternehmen
Cured 333
Write-off 269
Unknown 244
Worked-out 239
Distressed-sold 158
Nicht ausgefallen 4,687
Summe 5,930
Tabelle 4: Auspra¨gung der Ausfallgru¨nde der ausgefallenen Firmen in der Datenbank mit
der Anzahl der Beobachtungen. Mehrfachnennungen sind mo¨glich.
Auspra¨gung Anzahl an Beobachtungen
Free-of-interest-state 238
Relationship-cancelation 144
Payment-unlikely 58
Settlement 238
Non-accrued 115
Depreciation 2
90-day-delayed-payment 35
Specific-provision 562
Troubled-debt-restr 9
Provision 236
Bankruptcy 1
lungen unwahrscheinlich ist. Wenn verschiedene kreditspezifische Zahlungen nicht
geleistet wurden, wird dies mit Non-accrued vermerkt. Zahlungen, die seit min-
destens 90 Tagen u¨berfa¨llig sind, sind mit 90-day-delayed-payment gekennzeichnet.
Die Ku¨ndigung der Gescha¨ftsbeziehung wird durch Relationship-cancelation gekenn-
zeichnet und Probleme bei der Restrukturierung durch Troubled-debt-restr. Diese
Bezeichnung kommt mit lediglich 9 Beobachtungen relativ selten vor. Gleiches gilt
fu¨r die Bezeichnung Depreciation, welche Abschreibungen auf die Kreditlinie erfasst
und lediglich zweimal vorkommt, ebenso wie die Insolvenz des Unternehmens, wel-
che mit Bankruptcy gekennzeichnet ist und einmal registriert wird. Wenn ein Kredit
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nicht restrukturiert werden konnte und nur teilweise, beispielsweise durch Sicher-
heitenverwertung, zuru¨ckgefu¨hrt wurde, ist die Bezeichnung Settlement zu finden.
Wenn bei einem Kredit eine Einzelwertberichtigung vorgenommen wurde, ist dies
durch Specific-provision gekennzeichnet. Eine generelle Ru¨ckstellungsbildung wird
mit Provision bezeichnet.
4 Ausblick und zuku¨nftige Forschung
Die vorliegende Arbeit vermittelt einen ersten Eindruck bezu¨glich der Relevanz von
Cure Events in der Kreditrisikomodellierung. Die entwickelten Modelle basieren auf
einem Datensatz aus deutschen, mittelsta¨ndischen Unternehmen. Cure Events tre-
ten aber auch bei deutlich kleineren oder deutlich gro¨ßeren in- und ausla¨ndischen
Unternehmen auf. Die Analyse von Datensa¨tzen mit spezifischen Informationen zu
beobachtbaren Cure Events aus diesen Bereichen wu¨rde eine ho¨chst interessante
Vergleichsmo¨glichkeit bezogen auf die vorliegenden Ergebnisse ermo¨glichen. Hierbei
wa¨re es zudem erstrebenswert, auf la¨ngere Zeitreihen zugreifen zu ko¨nnen. Da es
naturgema¨ß gro¨ßerer Zeitintervalle bedarf, bis nach einem Ausfallereignis ein Cure
Event sichtbar wird, wu¨rde eine la¨ngere Beobachtungszeit beim vorliegenden Da-
tensatz unter Umsta¨nden die Anzahl der Unternehmen mit unbekanntem Status
zugunsten der Grundgesamtheit der Cure Events verringern.
Eine deutliche Ausweitung des Beobachtungszeitraums der historischen Daten wu¨rde
zudem die Integration von zufa¨lligen Effekten in die Modellscha¨tzung ermo¨glichen.
U¨ber die zufa¨lligen Effekte ko¨nnten unbeobachtbare, makroo¨konomische Einflu¨sse
erfasst werden, welche nicht explizit u¨ber die untersuchten Modellvariablen Beru¨ck-
sichtigung finden. Die Verwendung der zufa¨lligen Effekte ko¨nnte bei der Ermittlung
der Risikotreiber sowohl der Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten als auch der Heilungswahr-
scheinlichkeiten und der Ku¨ndigungswahrscheinlichkeiten eine sinnvolle Erweiterung
sein.
Schließlich wa¨re es eine vielversprechende Erweiterung, die im ersten Artikel vor-
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gestellte Mehrperiodenausfallprognose auf das Cure After Default Model aus dem
zweiten Artikel anzuwenden. Somit ko¨nnte das Ausfallrisiko eines Kreditportfolios
unter Beru¨cksichtigung der mo¨glichen Cure Events fu¨r mehrere Perioden progno-
stiziert werden. Hierdurch ko¨nnten mehrja¨hrige Prognosen fu¨r Ausfa¨lle und deren
Heilungsoptionen in mittelsta¨ndischen Kreditportfolien vorgenommen werden. Die
so ermittelten Erkenntnisse ko¨nnten von Banken beispielsweise genutzt werden, um
die Steuerung und Strategiefestlegung ihres Risikomanagements zu pra¨zisieren.
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Cure Events in Default Prediction
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the resurrection event regarding defaulted firms and
incorporates observable cure events in the default prediction of SME. Due
to the additional cure-related observable data, a completely new information
set is applied to predict individual default and cure events. This is a new
approach in credit risk that, to our knowledge, has not been followed yet.
Different firm-specific and macroeconomic default and cure-event-influencing
risk drivers are identified. The significant variables allow a firm-specific default
risk evaluation combined with an individual risk reducing cure probability.
The identification and incorporation of cure-relevant factors in the default risk
framework enable lenders to support the complete resurrection of a firm in the
case of its default and hence reduce the default risk itself. The estimations
are developed with a database that contains 5,930 mostly small and medium-
sized German firms and a total of more than 23,000 financial statements over
a time horizon from January 2002 to December 2007. Due to the significant
influence on the default risk probability as well as the bank’s possible profit
prospects concerning a cured firm, it seems essential for the risk management
to incorporate the additional cure information into the credit risk evaluation.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In credit risk evaluation the influence of cure events is gaining more and more atten-
tion. Recent literature stated that survival models, which incorporate cure events,
are used to improve the prediction of default events. In these models a fraction of
cured or immune borrowers is identified in order to deal with heavy censoring due to
rare default events. With this approach, one can not only predict when a borrower
defaults but also if he defaults at all. This is a big benefit to the existing ordinary
survival analysis. These methods were, for example, used by Mo and Yau (2010) and
Tong et al. (2012) to predict defaults among personal loan portfolios. Cure models
are also used to predict the default of corporate bonds or the bankruptcy of the
firms itself, see Yildirim (2008) and Topaloglu and Yildirim (2009). One significant
element in these models is that the cure events are unobserved and thus depend on
different definitions of long-term survivorship. Differing definitions of cure events
might reduce the comparability of these models and the findings most likely depend
on the number of cure events created on the basis of these definitions.
An alternative way to evaluate the cure event occurrence is the use of observable
cure events. Those events are observed among credit defaults when a default is trig-
gered which does not generate a loss for a lender due to a successful resurrection.
The use of observable cure events in the default prediction is a new approach in
credit risk that, to our knowledge, has not been followed yet.
Usually observable cure events are treated indirectly as a 100% recovery, see Cal-
abrese and Zenga (2010). Nevertheless, there are several reasons to evaluate observ-
able cure events separately and introduce them in the default prediction rather than
in the recovery estimation: an observable cure event has a significant impact on
the defaulted firms in a credit portfolio because cured firms are no longer defaulted
and are treated as “living” firms. Hence, the influence of this cure event is essential
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within the evaluation of default risk and is consequently an event that, if identified,
should rather be explicitly incorporated in the default prediction than only indi-
rectly measured by the estimation of the recovery rate. Default prediction models
that incorporate the cure event are not only capable of predicting when a borrower
defaults, but also if he defaults. If a fraction of defaultable firms in a bank’s credit
portfolio can be linked with a high cure probability this should reduce the equity
costs of the expected portfolio loss.
Furthermore, if a defaulted firm is cured it is a special situation for both parties, the
firm as well as the bank. The firm faced a default trigger and hence was most likely
in a financial struggle, which might even lead to bankruptcy, while the bank had to
deal with a possible loss due to significant depreciations as well as the loss of a busi-
ness relationship and its potential yield due to various cross-sell prospects. The cure
event leads to a complete new situation. If the business relationship is maintained,
it most probably becomes stronger than ever because both cope with this special
situation while other partners might have reduced or cut the relationship with this
firm. Both partners know each other even better after a successful recovery which
might reduces asymmetric information. The bank suffered no loss in a cure event.
In addition, it might gain a higher potential yield due to higher interest concerning
the loans or more cross-sell, for example, because of the customers desire to reduce
operative risks, such as commodity price risks or interest risks, with derivative prod-
ucts. Customer and bank become more aware concerning default-driving indicators
of the firm which might reduce the probability of a further default event regarding
the cured firm. Hence, the profit concerning a cured firm might be higher than ever,
while the default probability is reduced after the turnaround and the relationship
becomes strengthened.
Banks usually have a special “intensive care” unit which treats firms in financial
struggle in order to bring about a turnaround situation and thus generate a cure
event. If the resurrection expertise of these units is high enough, the profit of these
26
units can be maximized by buying external default events, e.g., loans of struggling
firms, in order to create cure events. Predominantly, these loans are bought with
a significant discount on the nominal amount. Independent of the intensity of the
following relationship with those borrowers, there is a high short-term profit upside
related to the extent of the discount.
Therefore, a cure event is much more than a recovery of 100% regarding the out-
standing loans; it is an indicator for a reduced credit portfolio risk, a sophisticated
“intensive care” unit and enhanced, short- as well as long-term, profit prospects.
If one could identify the risk drivers concerning the default and the resurrection
of a firm, it could be possible to identify the probability of a firm being cured. If
we know a firm’s cure probability as well as its default probability it is possible to
estimate the probability of the firm of being “immune” for a certain time period.
With this additional information, it might be possible to make more accurate loss
predictions. Important information concerning the default and cure events could be
recognized by these models, which might lead to lower costs or reveal, so far unseen,
risk potentials.
To reach the event of being cured, a firm has to face the event of default first.
The resurrection of a firm is an observable and loss-influencing but nevertheless
mostly unevaluated event. Data concerning cure events is rare and predominantly
only known to banks. Nevertheless, a cure event might contain a lot of borrower-
specific and risk-specific information and a separate evaluation of a firms resurrection
through a cure probability model might cover this information. Our study can make
use of bank-internal information regarding 1,243 default events and 333 cure events
among the defaulted firms.
The following sections start with a brief overview of the existing topic-concerned li-
terature. Then, based on the credit portfolio data, a default model is developed that
treats the firms, which are cured after their default event, as not-defaulted. This
model can be seen as a plain default model which does not incorporate cure-relevant
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information by different cure-related risk drivers. The influence of the cure event is
covered by the reduction of the number of defaulted firms. Since this model only
recognizes the definite default events, it is called the Definite Default Model (DDM).
In the next step, the handling of mixture cure model events which are used to handle
heavy censoring are elucidated. A widely used survival analysis model is discussed,
which includes a subject’s probability of being cured. It is shown that the model
can be seen as a combination of a certain cure probability model and the DDM.
In a further step, the approach is modified so that it incorporates observable cure
events. The cure event is only observable when the default event is observed and,
therefore, the influence of the not-defaulted firms is not evaluated, for example, by
linear regression. Hence, a sample selection bias could be generated, see Heckman
(1979). In order to omit this bias, the significant influence factors are evaluated
with a bivariate Probit sample selection model, see Boyes et al. (1989) and Greene
(1998). The new model consists of two main parts: a default probability model and
a cure probability model, both developed based on the entire financial database.
This new developed model is called the Cure After Default Model (CADM).
1.2 Literature Review
Earlier credit-risk-related scientific literature was written in the mid-1960s and fo-
cused on the default risk of single borrowers. Basic work was done by Beaver (1966,
1968a,b). At the end of the 1960s Altman (1968) defined a scoring model evaluating
credit risk on the basis of financial data: the Z-Score. A later generation of scoring
models is the O-Score, evaluated by Ohlson (1980) based on logistic regression. An
overview of the credit risk modeling on single loan basis can be found in Altman
and Saunders (1997).
In the following years scientific work turned its focus from the single loan to the eval-
uation of credit risk regarding loan portfolios. Two main approaches in the credit
risk literature are used as the basis for the evaluation of credit portfolio models:
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the structural model approach and the intensity model approach. The pioneers of
the structural models were Merton (1974, 1977) and Black and Scholes (1973). In
their option-pricing approach, a firm’s assets follow a geometric Brownian motion
and the default probability is only driven by the firm’s distance-to-default. The
portfolio model used in Basel II as well as the Portfolio ManagerTM model from
Moodys and the Credit MetricsTM from JP Morgan Chase are examples of the
use of the structural model approach. The intensity or reduced form models are
based on the individual default intensity process of a borrower. Conditional on the
realization of the intensity the number of defaults up to time t are independent
Poisson-distributed events. Basic work is done by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jar-
row et al. (1997), Lando (1998) and Hillegeist et al. (2004). The portfolio model
Credit Risk+TM from Credit Suisse Financial Products uses this approach. Hybrid
models that use a combination of both approaches can be found in Duffie and Lando
(2001) and Madan and Unal (2000). On overview concerning the intensity model
approach can be found in Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) and Bluhm et al. (2003)1. A
quite new development in literature is the multi-period prediction with credit risk
models, see Duffie et al. (2007) and Duffie et al. (2009).
Besides the multi-period prediction the recent credit risk literature pays more and
more attention to the cure event in default prediction. Due to the fact that a default
event is a very rare event, the applied survival analysis for default evaluation faces a
high amount of censored observations which can distort the findings. The problem
of heavy censoring among the observed subjects is well known in medicine and is
routinely solved by the use of mixture cure models, where the patients are considered
cured if they are immune concerning the evaluated disease, see Farewell (1982), Kuk
and Chen (1992) and Hughes (1999). Mixture cure models are widely used among
clinical trials and separate the data generally into a cure fraction and a fraction
of not-cured subjects, see Peng and Dear (2000), Sy and Taylor (2000), Corbie`re
and Joly (2007) and Lai and Yau (2009). It is common to model both groups, the
1Cp. Bluhm et al. (2003), p. 55-164.
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immune subjects in the cure fraction as well as the fraction of not-immune subjects,
conditional on some covariate vectors in order to explain the two distributions. The
covariate vectors can consist of the same covariates, but not necessarily. Some co-
variates may affect the possibility of being cured but may not have any influence
on the timing of the event of interest and vice versa, see Yu and Peng (2008) and
Zhang and Peng (2009). The use of mixture cure models is a quite new aspect in
the credit-default-related literature. However, the cure event takes part in a wide
range of credit default risk evaluation models. In several credit scoring models this
approach is used in combination with personal loan data recently, see, for example,
Beran and Djaidja (2007), Mo and Yau (2010) and Tong et al. (2012). However,
the approach can also be found concerning the credit risk analysis regarding the
bond market or firms. Yildirim (2008) used the mixture cure model approach with
random effects to model long-term survivorship concerning the default estimation of
commercial mortgage backed securities. He considered that a reasonable contingent
of the observed securities will never default during the duration and thus distorts the
results of the survival analysis without cure fraction. The correlation between the
securities is captured through the introduction of three independent random effects
concerning region, property type and loan level. Topaloglu and Yildirim (2009) used
a mixture cure model in order to predict the default of publicly traded US firms.
They concluded that in this case the common assumption in the survival analysis,
where every subject will eventually reach the event of interest, is too pessimistic for
the economic framework.
1.3 Main Contributions
The introduction of cure events in credit risk modeling generates a wide range of
additional options for superior models. The latest work in the credit literature, e.g.,
Tong et al. (2012), used mixture cure models to enhance the performance of survival
analysis concerning default risk modeling. This approach uses the unobserved cure
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event to deal with heavy censoring in the default data. We follow an alternative
way to evaluate the cure event with the utilization of observable cure events. The
idea that a cure event can be reached after the default is observed can be found in
Ambrose and Capone Jr. (1996) where different foreclosure alternatives are modeled
concerning mortgage obligations. But in this model the cure probability is given ex-
ogenously without further evaluation. In our paper the cure probability is not given
exogenously. A main focus is due to the evaluation of the cure-specific influence
factors and the estimation of individual firm-specific cure probabilities.
Predominantly, if a cure event is observed by a bank then the firm is treated as
not-defaulted, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005). An indirect
influence of a cure event is usually recognized by the estimation of the recovery rate
as 100% recovery, see Renault and Scaillet (2004) and Calabrese and Zenga (2010).
Recent literature indicated that the recovery rate is strong related to the default
risk, see Bade et al. (2011), Pykthin (2003) and Qi and Yang (2009). Neverthe-
less, a cure event is much more than a recovery of 100% regarding the outstanding
loans, it is an indicator for reduced credit portfolio risk and enhanced short- as well
as long-term profit prospects. Hence, the cure event should be recognized by the
default prediction. We develop a default risk model that applies this approach in
order to be capable not only of predicting when a default occurs but also whether
it occurs or not.
A cure event is only observable among defaulted firms; therefore, the influence of
not-defaulted firms on a firm’s probability of being cured is ignored without further
modifications. The estimation of resurrection influencing risk drivers might lead
to biased findings because non-randomly selected samples are used, see Heckman
(1976, 1979). We use a bivariate Probit sample selection estimator to estimate the
cure-related drivers and omit a sample selection bias, see Boyes et al. (1989), Greene
(1998) and Lee et al. (2004).
The models, which are predominantly discussed in the literature, are nearly all de-
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veloped based on bond issues or personal loan data, while the developed model in
this paper is based on firm-specific information. Our database contains a lot of infor-
mation over a representative sample of the cross-section concerning German SMEs.
The database is not preselected. Hence, it includes every firm that is a Dresdner
Bank2 customer and whose financial data is listed in a risk program necessary for
a loan decision. The database can be seen as an example for a typical bank credit
portfolio of corporate customers.
The default prediction models DDM and CADM, which are developed in this paper,
both use a default probability model in order to cover a firm’s default-influencing risk
drivers. In addition, the CADM uses a cure probability model, based on observed
cure events.
2 Cure and Default Models
In this section different credit risk approaches are developed followed by the descrip-
tion of the applied estimation methods. The first described model, the definitive
default model, treats the cured firms as not-defaulted and excludes them from the
fraction of defaulted firms. Cure-specific information is not incorporated by risk
drivers and the default risk is evaluated based on the remaining “definitive” default
events. After that the mixture cure model, a survival model which incorporates
long-term survivorship, will be elucidated. It can be seen as a combination of a cure
probability model and the DDM.
Then the cure event evaluation in the mixture cure model is modified, so that it can
be applied regarding an SME-specific credit portfolio including observed cure events
after the default event. A cure model is constructed, which allows cure-relevant
risk drivers and their influence to be identified. Following this, the cure model is
combined with a default model in order to allow cure events among the defaulted
2The firm-specific data was provided by Dresdner Bank AG in spring 2008. Dresdner Bank AG
was taken over by the Commerzbank AG in summer 2008.
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firms. The parameters of the default model and the cure model are estimated si-
multaneously via a bivariate Probit sample selection model. The combination of the
cure model and the default model is called the Cure After Default Model.
2.1 Risk Management without Cure Events: The Definite
Default Model
It is common in credit risk evaluation that cured firms are no longer treated as de-
faulted firms, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005). Hence the cure
event is indirectly recognized, but it is not separately modeled and evaluated. In
order to construct a plain model that uses this approach, the Definite Default Model
is derived. In the DDM the cured firms are treated as not-defaulted. The DDM is
used in the following to compare the CADM with a standard credit risk approach.
A default model is estimated, which uses only the definitely defaulted firms as ob-
served default events. Through this model different firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk drivers are identified. The risk drivers are based on known financial data of the
previous time period. The default intensity λ of a firm i (i = 1, ..., N) for one time
period t (t = 1, ..., T ) is described by the following equation:
λ(Ui,t−1, Vt−1) = e−(ζ+β·Ui,t−1+θ·Vt−1). (1)
Ui,t−1 is a vector of observable one-year time-lagged firm-specific risk drivers. The
vector Vt−1 includes different observable one-year time-lagged macroeconomic vari-
ables that influence all firms at the same intensity and depend only on the time
period. ζ is a constant, β and θ are vectors of the different parameters of the covari-
ables to be estimated. The coherence between the one-year default intensity and
the one-year default probability is as follows:
PDi(t) = 1− e−λ(Ui,t−1,Vt−1)·1, (2)
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see Cleves et al. (2004)3. Based on these probabilities the individual defaults can be
predicted. The approach is illustrated in Figure 1.
Firm i
Not-
defaulted
Definitely 
defaultedPDi(t)
1-PDi(t)
Default model in the DDM
Figure 1: Influence of the default probability in the Definite Default Model. Depending
on the individual default probability the firms in the portfolio either default during the
observed time period or they survive the time period.
2.2 Risk Management with Unobserved Cure Events: The
Mixture Cure Model
Mixture cure models (MCM) are applied in order to deal with heavy censoring in
the survival analysis. These models were recently used in the credit risk framework
in order to enhance credit scoring models as well as for models used to evaluate
defaultable bonds or the bankruptcy of firms. MCM themselves are not a new
statistical scope; they are common in medical science, for example, for evaluating
diseases within clinical trials such as cancer or for the research of survival studies.
Due to medical advancements it is common that a significant part of the observed
patients in the clinical trials are long-term survivors. In some cases, a cure fraction
becomes imperative because a heavy censoring even in long-term periods may con-
tort the results of survival analysis trials. These models are a mixture of the normal
group of subjects at risk, which either experiences death or is censored, and a group
of cured long-term survivors. This analysis method allows both modeling of timing
3Cp. Cleves et al. (2004), p. 16 and 222-224.
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and modeling of the probability of the event of interest at the same time. Further-
more, it is possible to explain timing and probability through different risk drivers
and to estimate them separately via parametric, semi-parametric or non-parametric
models. An implicit condition of this model type is a sufficient long data history
because a cured person can normally not be identified in the short run, see Yu and
Peng (2008).
The MCM consists of a cure fraction and a latency survival model. The probabil-
ity that a subject i (i = 1, ..., N) belongs to the cured fraction in time period t
(t = 1, ..., T ) is often measured through logistic regression:
PCi(t) =
ezi,t−1
1 + ezi,t−1
, (3)
where zi,t−1 is a state matrix composed of covariate parameters, see Farewell (1982).
In order to maintain consistency in notation, we use one-period time-lagged variables
t− 1, while most of the cited work uses the notation t.
In the survival model several risk drivers determine the default probability. In order
to include a cured fraction in the survival model the marginal survival function Smi (t)
and the marginal density function fmi (t), indicated by an upper ’m’, are modeled
as:
Smi (t) = PCi(t) + (1− PCi(t)) · S(xi,t−1)l, (4)
fmi (t) = (1− PCi(t)) · f(xi,t−1)l, (5)
where S(xi,t−1)l is the latency survival function and f(xi,t−1)l is the latency density
function of the model that includes a cure fraction, indicated by an upper ’l’. The
state matrix xi,t−1 contains several risk drivers. These risk drivers can be the same
as in zi,t−1 but they do not have to be. In order to separate this model from a model
without a cure fraction as well as from the cure probability model generated through
logistic regression, it is called the latency model. Without a cure fraction the model
is reduced to a standard survival model, see Corbie`re and Joly (2007) and Yu and
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Subject i
Not-cured
Cured
Not-
defaulted
(Definitely)
defaulted
PCi(t)
PDi(t)
1-PDi(t)
1-PCi(t)
2nd step: Default model1st step: Cure model
Figure 2: Relation between the different steps regarding the Mixture Cure Model, cp.
Topaloglu and Yildirim (2009). First the cure fraction is predicted and separated, among
the remaining subjects defaults are predicted in the second step.
Peng (2008). Figure 2 shows the relation between the different fractions.
2.3 Risk Management with Observed Cure Events: The
Cure After Default Model
If one extends the mixture cure approach so that it fits in a default prediction en-
vironment with observed cure events after the default event, several modifications
have to be made.
Firstly, the assumption that there is a fraction of borrowers in a credit portfolio,
which is not connected with any default risk and will never default is dropped. In
the CADM every firm has a certain default probability and the possibility of being
cured is only relevant for those firms, which triggered a default event. This is due
to the fact that only after an observed default event can a firm be cured. This
assumption seems to be more intuitive and is also underlined by the empirical ob-
servations concerning the recent financial crisis of 2008 as well as the ongoing crisis
in 2011/2012. There seems to be no group of borrowers that are not under risk.
Every credit agreement is currently at risk, even if it is a very unlikely one.
Secondly, from an empirical point of view only defaulted firms are able to become
cured. In order to incorporate this fact in the model, the two steps of the MCM are
changed: in a first step, a default model is used to calculate the firm’s individual
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default probability in order to predict the default events. In a second step, a cure
probability model is used to calculate the firm’s individual cure probability in or-
der to predict the cure events among the predicted defaults. The order of the two
steps in the CADM now displays the empirical circumstances of resurrection in the
credit-default environment.
Thirdly, the change of the order of the two steps has major implications on the de-
fault probability as well as on the cure probability model: if the cure event was not
separated previously, one has to apply a default probability model that recognizes
all default events, even if the firms might be cured afterwards. Hence, the DDM is
not appropriate and a new default probability has to be estimated that counts every
default event as a default, independent of its further deployment. In the new default
model of the CADM, similar to the DDM, different firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk drivers are identified. The risk drivers are based on known financial data of the
previous time period.
Fourthly, the logistic regression used in the MCM concerning the cure probability
model incorporates only the narrow sample of defaulted firms and ignores the rest
of the firms in the credit portfolio, because the cure event is only observable when
the default event is observed. Nevertheless, the not-defaulted firms have a certain
default probability. The exclusion of the not-defaulted firms would neglect this in-
fluence and might generate a sample selection bias, see Heckman (1976, 1979). A
bivariate Probit sample selection model is used to omit a possible bias, see Boyes
et al. (1989), Greene (1998) and Lee et al. (2004). The model is used to predict
individual cure probabilities PCi(t) for the firms, whereas different one-year time-
lagged firm-specific and macroeconomic influence factors are evaluated as influence
factors.
After considering the described modifications a new credit default model that in-
cludes cure-specific risk drivers besides the default influencing ones is created: The
Cure After Default Model. The CADM is visualized in Figure 3.
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Firm i Cured
Defaulted
Not-
defaulted
Defaulted (and 
possibly cured)
PCi(t)
PDi(t)
1-PDi(t)
1-PCi(t)
1st step: Default model 2nd step: Cure model
Figure 3: Relation between the two steps in the Cure After Default Model. In the first
step the individual default probability is used to predict default events among the firms
in the portfolio. In the second step the individual cure probability among the defaulted
firms is used to predict cure events.
The default model in the CADM incorporates all observed default events, inde-
pendent of the further deployment, because the cure event is introduced after the
default model. The definition of the default event is the only difference concerning
the default model of the DDM, which reduces the number of default events by the
fraction of cured firms.
The firms cure probability is relevant for the second step and is used to identify
significant variables that influence a firm’s probability of being cured. With the
cure-related risk drivers it is possible to calculate a firm’s individual cure probabili-
ties in order to predict cure events among the predicted default events in the credit
portfolio. This model introduces all resurrection-related information concerning the
individual borrowers.
2.4 Estimation of the Default- and Cure-Related Parame-
ters
2.4.1 Estimation of the Parameters for the DDM
The probability distribution of firm-specific defaults, that are needed for the distri-
bution of portfolio loss, are based on individual firm-specific default probabilities.
The default probabilities are calculated by a model with observable firm-specific
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and macroeconomic risk drivers. The correlation is induced by the macroeconomic
variables, see Yamaguchi et al. (2002) and Duffie et al. (2007).
An accelerated-failure-time model is used. The estimated findings, therefore, have
to be interpreted as follows: covariables with a positive parameter delay the time
until a default occurs. They protect the firm against a possible default. Covariables
with a negative value accelerate the time until a default occurs. In order to receive
the findings of a proportional hazard model, one can simply change the algebraic
sign of the estimated parameters, see Cleves et al. (2004)4.
The observable firm-specific and macroeconomic variables of the years 2002 to 2006
are the input data of the default model. The variables are one-year time-lagged.
The financial data of the year 2007 is not applied, because defaults are not available
for the year 2008. The covariables are assumed to be constant within the different
time periods, they change only from year to year. The time homogenous descrip-
tion refers only to the respective time period. Over the different time periods the
variables change and become time dependent.
Annual financial statements and accordingly subsequent derived ratings have always
been in the main focus when default probabilities for individual firms are calculated,
see Altman (1968), Beaver (1966, 1968a,b), and Ohlson (1980). Duffie et al. (2007)
used for the evaluation of a default model based on US American industrial firm’s
three-month treasury interest rates as macroeconomic influence factors. Also the
GDP is evaluated as a potential influence factor. In our paper we use different
quotes derived from the annual financial statements of the firms in the credit port-
folio as well as the sales and total capital as proxy for the firm size. The 12-month
EURIBOR and the German annual GDP growth rate are used to capture macroe-
conomic influences.
The logarithmized firm-specific covariates ln(Sales) and ln(Total Capital) are men-
tioned in units of a thousand euros. The evaluated variables measured in quotes
are Gross Profit, Long-term Liabilities, Current Liabilities, Long-term Provisions
4Cp. Cleves et al. (2004), p. 13-16, 123-127, 200-212 and 215-224.
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and Equity in relation to the Total Capital and Fixed Assets in relation to Total
Assets. Also the evaluated macroeconomic variables 12-month EURIBOR and an-
nual growth rate of the German GDP are one-year time-lagged. In this estimation
method the cured default events are mentioned as not-defaulted. The remaining
default events are defined as definite default events and are captured in the esti-
mation procedure through the dummy variable dd. The parameters are estimated
through the maximum likelihood method. The likelihood function is applied to the
individual firm i (i = 1, ..., N) at the time intervals t (t = 1, ..., T ). The likelihood
function is:
L =
T∏
t=1
Nt∏
i=1
[(f(Ui,t−1, Vt−1))ddit · (S(Ui,t−1, Vt−1))1−ddit ], (6)
whereas Ui,t−1 is a vector of firm-specific covariates and Vt−1 is a vector of macroe-
conomic variables. The binary dummy variable ddit (ddit ∈ {0, 1}) indicates if
the respective firm has a definite default event within the observed time interval
(ddit = 1) or if it survives the observed time interval (ddit = 0). By inserting the
relation
f(Ui,t−1, Vt−1) = λ(Ui,t−1, Vt−1) · S(Ui,t−1, Vt−1) (7)
into equation (6), it follows:
L =
T∏
t=1
Nt∏
i=1
[(λ(Ui,t−1, Vt−1) · S(Ui,t−1, Vt−1, ))ddit · (S(Ui,t−1, Vt−1))1−ddit ] (8)
⇐⇒ L =
T∏
t=1
Nt∏
i=1
(λ(Ui,t−1, Vt−1, ))ddit · (S(Ui,t−1, Vt−1))1. (9)
The maximization is done using a Newton-Rhapson algorithm, see Blossfeld et al.
(1986)5, Miller (1981)6 as well as Yamaguchi et al. (2002). The 1,243 default events
are reduced to 922 observed default events due to missing data. These observed
default events are further reduced to 657, because the 265 cured firms are not treated
5Cp. Blossfeld et al. (1986), p. 67-76.
6Cp. Miller (1981), p. 16-20.
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as defaults. The estimations are made with the NLMIXED procedure of the program
SAS.
2.4.2 Estimation of the Parameters for the CADM
As in the MCM a cure fraction exists in the CADM. A substantial difference is that
this cure fraction is not a fraction of subjects which will never experience the event
of interest but it is a fraction of firms, related to all defaulted firms, that could
recover without any loss for the bank. One main advantage compared to the MCM
is the identifiability of the cured fraction because these cure events are definitely
observable.
An additional challenge compared to the MCM is the possible sample selection
bias due to the sample reduction from the N firms in the portfolio to the reduced
sample of defaulted firms. In order to avoid a possible bias a bivariate Probit sample
selection model is used, see Heckman (1976, 1979), Greene (1998) and Boyes et al.
(1989).
The standard Heckman model consists of the two dependent variables dit and cit.
Their corresponding parameters are estimated via a linear equation. One dependent
variable, cit is only observable if a second dependent variable, the binary default
indicator variable dit ∈ {0, 1}, has the outcome 1, hence a default occurred. The
observable indicator dit has the outcome 0 if the not-observable metric variable d
∗
it
falls below a specific threshold:
d∗it = α
Hd · xHdi,t−1 + uHdit (10)
dit =

1 if d∗it > 0
0 if d∗it ≤ 0
(11)
where αHd is a parameter vector for the covariates to be estimated. The state matrix
xHdi,t−1 contains several one-year time-lagged risk drivers. u
Hd
it is the residual error
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term.
In our evaluated model also the dependent variable cit is a binary variable, because
its outcome is 1 if the defaulted firm is cured afterwards and 0 if it is not-cured. The
standard Heckman method is not appropriate concerning this special case, because
of the fact that the outcome of the second equation is binary. In order to handle the
Heckman model with two binary dependent variables, we apply a bivariate Probit
sample selection model, see Boyes et al. (1989), Lee et al. (2004). In the case of
dit = 1, cit is an observable binary indicator that has the outcome 0 if the not
observable metric variable c∗it falls below a specific threshold and 1 otherwise:
c∗it = α
Hc · xHci,t−1 + uHcit , if dit = 1 (12)
cit =

1 if c∗it > 0 and dit = 1
0 if c∗it ≤ 0 and dit = 1
(13)
where αHc is a parameter vector for the covariates to be estimated. The state
matrix xHci,t−1 contains several one-year time-lagged risk drivers. u
Hc
it is the residual
error term. The error terms uHdit and u
Hc
it are jointly normal distributed with a mean
of 0, a standard deviation of 1 and a correlation ρH . The outcome of cit and dit is
either 0 or 1, hence, three combinations are possible: dit = 0, dit = 1 and cit = 0 as
well as dit = 1 and cit = 1. This leads to:
1. If no default occurred:
Pr (dit = 0) = 1− Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
)
(14)
2. If a default occurred and the firm is not-cured:
Pr (dit = 1, cit = 0) = Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
)
− φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHc · xHci,t−1, ρH
)
(15)
42
3. If a default occurred and the firm is cured:
Pr (dit = 1, cit = 1) = φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHc · xHci,t−1, ρH
)
(16)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function for the standardized univariate
normal distribution and φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the stan-
dardized bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρH , see Boyes et al. (1989).
The likelihood of the model can be written, conditional on the identified covariates,
as:
L =
T∏
t=1
Nt∏
i=1
(
1− Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
))1−dit ·
(
Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
)
− φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHc · xHci,t−1, ρH
))dit·(1−cit) ·(
φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHc · xHci,t−1, ρH
))dit·cit
. (17)
For the maximization of the function a quasi-Newton-Raphson algorithm is used.
The estimations are made simultaneous with the QLIM procedure of the program
SAS. From the 1,243 defaulted firms 711 are observed in the estimation due to
missing data or unknown occurrence after the default event. Regarding these firms
250 are cured (ckt = 1) and 461 are not-cured (ckt = 0).
3 Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Origin of the Database
The data was provided for scientific evaluation in anonymous form by the corporate
banking and risk controlling divisions of Dresdner Bank AG in spring 2008. The
database contains multi-year data from balance sheets and profit and loss statements
concerning a total number of 5,930 German firms as well as 1,243 observed default
events. Triggers for a default event are, for example, 90-day-delayed-payment, no-
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tice of relationship-cancelation through the bank and bankruptcy. Concerning the
defaulted firms information regarding the deployment in the bank is available, for
example, if the exposure is written off, if the credit was sold with discount or if the
default could be handled without loss for the bank. The firms are predominantly not
listed on a stock market. The observed firms range over many different branches. In
total 23,894 financial statements over a period from 01.01.2002 to 31.12.2007 were
evaluated. The financial data is solely taken from individual financial statements.
Consolidated financial statements are not used on purpose within the modeling.
This is due to the fact that the default event, from the lender’s point of view, is in
the main focus and thus it is not relevant if there exists a mother firm which could
solve some of the problems after a while because alone the fact that there is a prob-
lem, as, for example, a delayed payment of at least 90 days, generates bureaucratic
effort and a loss for the lender becomes likely.
The database concerning the financial statements include: branch, sales, EBITDA7,
EBITA8, gross profit, net profit, current liabilities, long-term liabilities, long-term
provisions, equity, fixed assets as well as current assets. Furthermore, only financial
data that relies on a 12-month time period are used. Shortened financial years and
opening balance sheets are not used. If for one firm several default events are men-
tioned, the first is used as the relevant default event.
In this paper the following units are applied concerning the firm-specific information
from the database: the quotes of gross profit to total capital, current liabilities to
total capital, long-term liabilities to total capital, long-term provisions to total ca-
pital, equity to total capital and fixed assets to total assets as well as current assets
to total assets. In addition, the logarithmized total capital and the logarithmized
sales are used. The logarithmized values are based on units of a thousand euros.
The logarithmization is done in order to smooth the data and hence generate more
comparable findings with the estimated quotes.
7Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
8Earnings before interest, taxes and amortization.
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3.2 Default Information
From the total of 5,930 firms in the database 1,243 firms defaulted in the period
from January 2002 to December 2007. For the year 2002 only not-defaulted firms
are mentioned in the database and the first defaults are observed in January 2003,
because the used risk and accounting system was activated in the turn of the year
2002/2003. A total of 2,779 years of balance sheet data are counted among these de-
faulted firms. That means that on average 2.2 years per firm are known. Regarding
the 4,687 not-defaulted firms on average 4.5 years per firm are known. The further
deployment in the bank after the default of the firms is also part of the data. Five
possible occurrences are mentioned: Cured means that the problem with the firm
could be removed without any loss for the bank, Write-off means that some part or
all of the exposure had to be expensed, Worked-out means that the loan agreement
is canceled and the securities had to be disposed to cover the outstanding liabilities,
Distressed-sold means that the loans had been sold with loss. The fifth calibration is
Unknown, which means that the further development after the default event is not
definitely known. Concerning the calibration of the defaulted firms in the database
333 firms are Cured, 269 are Write-off, 244 are Unknown, 239 are Worked-out and
158 are mentioned as Distressed-sold. These facts are summed up in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration status of all firms in the database with the total number of annual
financial statements for each of the specifications.
Calibration Number of Firms Number of Balance Sheet Years
Cured 333 688
Write-off 269 635
Unknown 244 675
Worked-out 239 481
Distressed-sold 158 300
No default 4,687 21,115
Sum 5,930 23,894
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4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Definite Default Model
In Table 2 the findings concerning the parameter estimation of the default model
with definite default events are shown. Three different variants are distinguished; the
first contains only a constant and the macroeconomic variables, the second variant
includes all evaluated variables, and the third variant is the final default model of
the DDM. In addition, the hazard rate is mentioned. It indicates a covariable’s
influence on the default intensity if its value is changed by one unit, given that all
other variables remain unchanged, see Cleves et al. (2004)9.
One should keep in mind that the coefficients are depending on their units. For
example, the 12-month EURIBOR is mentioned in percent while the ln(Sales) is
mentioned in logarithmized units of a thousand euros. Therefore, the hazard rate
indicates the influence of these variables on a firms default intensity by the change of
one percent point or one logarithmized unit of a thousand euros, respectively. The
quotes are mentioned as ratios, for example, 0.23. A change by one unit could be
seen, for example, as a change from 0 to 1. If one would like to interpret the quote’s
influence in percent points, one needs to divide the parameter and the standard
error by 100. The significance would remain unchanged, see Cleves et al. (2004)10.
Variant 1 contains only a constant and the macroeconomic variables. All estimated
parameters are significant, the parameter for the constant and the GDP at 1% and
the one for the 12-month EURIBOR at the 10% level. The hazard rate regarding
the constant is 8.04%11. Concerning the GDP the hazard rate indicates that an in-
crease of about one percentage point reduces the default intensity by 54%. The same
increase would reduce the intensity by 18% regarding the 12-month EURIBOR.
9Cp. Cleves et al. (2004), p. 13-16, 123-127 and 215-224.
10Cp. Cleves et al. (2004), p. 125-127.
11657 default events are observed in the estimation. The estimated basic hazard rate is much
higher than the average number of default events because the influence of the macroeconomic
variables is not at 0 value. If the weighted average value of the macroeconomic variables is used,
the average default rate is at 1.4%.
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Table 2: Estimation of the parameters concerning the Definite Default Model, separated
in three different variants. Variant 1: default model solely with a constant and the
macroeconomic variables, Variant 2: default model with all evaluated variables, Variant
3: final default model of the DDM. (Standard deviations in parentheses)
Covariate Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3
Para- Hazard Para- Hazard Para- Hazard
meter Rate meter Rate meter Rate
Constant 2.5209*** 0.0804 3.6415*** 0.0262 4.0564*** 0.0173
(0.2659) (0.5064) (0.4354)
ln(Sales) 0.1870*** 0.8294 0.1848*** 0.8313
(0.0283) (0.0258)
Gross Profit / 0.2338*** 0.7915 0.2286*** 0.7957
Total Capital (0.0450) (0.0434)
Current Liabilities / -2.1349*** 8.4562 -2.1447*** 8.5395
Total Capital (0.4271) (0.4262)
Long-term Liabilities / -2.0779*** 7.9877 -2.0711*** 7.9336
Total Capital (0.4363) (0.4283)
Long-term Provisions / -1.0533* 2.8671 -1.0630* 2.8950
Total Capital (0.6159) (0.6148)
Equity / Total Capital 0.7677*** 0.4641 0.7705*** 0.4628
(0.2572) (0.2567)
Fixed Assets / 0.0303 0.9702
Total Assets (0.1725)
ln(Total Capital) -0.1388*** 1.1489 -0.1365*** 1.1463
(0.0351) (0.0328)
GDP 0.7844*** 0.4564 0.7304*** 0.4817 0.8297*** 0.4362
(0.0842) (0.0857) (0.0607)
12-month EURIBOR 0.2074* 0.8127 0.2073 0.8128
(0.1257) (0.1280)
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5% , ***significant at 1%
The second variant of the Definite Default Model includes all reviewed covariates
in the database. The estimated parameters for the variables Fixed Assets to Total
Assets and 12-month EURIBOR are not significant. The constant and the para-
meters for the macroeconomic variable GDP and the firm-specific variables Current
and Long-term Liabilities and Gross Profit in relation to Total Capital respectively
as well as the ln(Sales) and ln(Total Capital) are significant at the 1% level. The
parameter for the variable Long-term Provisions to Total Capital is significant at
10%. Due to the enhanced number of explaining variables the basic hazard rate is
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reduced to 2.6%. A negative algebraic sign can be seen concerning Current Liabili-
ties to Total Capital, Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital, Long-term Provisions
to Total Capital and ln(Total Capital).
The third variant is derived from the second one and is the applied default model in
the DDM. The remaining significant parameters are unchanged in significance and
influence direction. The hazard rate concerning the constant reduces from 2.62% to
1.73%.
The negative influence of the Long-term Provisions to Total Capital could be in-
terpreted as the effect that firms, which have the need for provision building for
imminent losses or uncertain liabilities, have, on average, a lower financial strength.
The negative influence of the Current and Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital
indicates that firms within the observed portfolio with a quite high value concerning
the liability quotes have to pay a relative high amount of interest on average, are
less flexible concerning an expansion of the credit lines for necessary investments or
an spontaneous recognition of market chances.
The positive influence of the Gross Profit to Total Capital underlines the intuitive
assumption that a high profit means a high financial strength, flexibility and it is an
indicator for a well-working market strategy. The positive influence of the Equity
to Total Capital might be due to a higher financial flexibility and stability of firms
with a high amount of equity.
The variables ln(Sales) and ln(Total Capital) can both be seen as proxies for the size
of a firm. Hence, the opposing influence of these parameters is somewhat surprising
at first glance. Taking the influence direction into account one can say that firms,
which are bigger concerning their sales, have a lower default probability because of
their market influence and have a higher bargaining power, whereas firms which are
bigger concerning their assets might have a lower flexibility, cannot react in time if
changes in important markets are developing and thus fail in these situations more
often.
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The positive influence of the GDP can be explained by the fact that in economic
upturns a lower number of firms fails due to the high market demand.
In general, one can state that firms with relatively high sales, gross profit and equity
and a quite low position of current and long-term liabilities, long-term provisions and
total capital have a pretty good chance of surviving, especially when the economy
is in upturn and the GDP is relative high.
4.2 Cure After Default Model
The findings concerning the parameter estimation of the covariates regarding the
bivariate Probit sample selection model are shown in Table 3. Variant 1 contains the
default model for the probability of selection among all N firms as well as the cure
model with sample correction concerning the defaulted firms. Hence the selection
part of variant 1 is the default model of the CADM and the cure part of Variant 1 is
the cure model of the CADM. Variant 2 is the cure model without sample correction
concerning the defaulted firms. In order to compare the findings of the sample selec-
tion part of the CADM with the default model of the DDM, the algebraic sign of the
parameters has to be switched. In the default model of the DDM an accelerated fai-
lure time model is used. Hence, a default probability enhancing variable is indicated
by a negative algebraic sign of its estimated parameter because it reduces the time
to the default event. In the sample selection part the parameters of the regression
are estimated by Probit. dit = 1 indicates a default event, hence a positive-valued
parameter indicates a default event supporting variable. The selection part of the
CADM and the default model of the DDM evaluate similar things: default event
influencing variables. All estimated firm-specific and macroeconomic parameters in
the selection part are identical in their significance and influence direction with the
respective parameters in the default model of the DDM. This fact underlines the
robustness of the identified risk-driving variables in the selection part of the CADM.
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Table 3: Estimation of the bivariate Probit sample selection model of the CADM,
separated in two different variants. Variant 1 contains the estimated parameters
concerning the probability for the default event and the estimated parameters regarding
the sample corrected cure model, variant 2 contains via logistic regression with Probit
link function estimated parameters without sample correction. (Std. Errors in
parenthesis)
Covariate Variant 1 Variant 2
Selection Part Cure Part
Constant -1.0477*** 1.5169* 0.7017*
(0.2057) (0.8069) (0.4226)
ln(Sales) -0.0941*** 0.0916** 0.0647*
(0.0133) (0.0426) (0.0385)
Gross Profit / Total Capital -0.3916***
(0.0534)
Current Liabilities / 0.6690*** -0.9418** -0.6083**
Total Capital (0.1429) (0.3978) (0.3012)
Long-term Liabilities / 0.5483*** -0.7515* -0.4152
Total Capital (0.1496) (0.4155) (0.3169)
Long-term Provisions / -1.4465** -1.2793*
Total Capital (0.6856) (0.7135)
Equity / Total Capital -0.48027***
(0.1088)
ln(Total Capital) 0.0663*** -0.1394*** -0.1287***
(0.0162) (0.0472) (0.0493)
GDP -0.2608***
(0.0385)
12-month EURIBOR -0.1575***
(0.0592)
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5% , ***significant at 1%
4.2.1 Default-Related Parameter Estimates of the CADM
Concerning the selection part of the model in variant 1, the constant as well as the
estimated parameters of the macroeconomic and firm-specific risk drivers are signi-
ficant at the 1% level. The estimated parameters have a negative value concerning
the constant and the firm-specific covariables ln(Sales), Gross Profit to Total Capital
and Equity to Total Capital as well as the macroeconomic covariables growth rate
of the German GDP and 12-month EURIBOR. The estimated parameters regarding
the Current Liabilities to Total Capital, Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital and
ln(Total Capital) have a positive algebraic sign. A relative high value concerning the
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variables Gross Profit to Total Capital, Equity to Total Capital, ln(Sales), growth
rate of the German GDP and 12-month EURIBOR has a positive effect on a firms
survival probability. A high value concerning the variables Current Liabilities to
Total Capital, Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital and ln(Total Capital) has a
negative impact. A higher Gross Profit to Total Capital is an indicator for financial
strength and a sustainable business model with high margins. Firms with a quite
high Equity to Total Capital can face short-term-loss situations without much effort,
they have a better standing in loan negotiations and have a higher financial stability.
For firms with relatively high short- and long-term liability positions, it might be
more difficult to get more liabilities form their borrowers. Hence, possible short-
term opportunities can not be realized with further credit. In addition, there is a
higher dependence concerning their borrowers and a loss situation can soon end up
in bankruptcy. As discussed concerning the findings of the default model regarding
the DDM, the variables ln(Sales) and ln(Total Capital) can both be seen as proxies
for the size of a firm. The findings suggest that firms with relative more sales have a
lower default probability because of their market influence and a higher bargaining
power. Whereas firms which are bigger concerning their assets might have a lower
flexibility and cannot react in time in situations of important market developments
and thus more often fail in these situations. The GDP has a significant positive
influence on a firms survival probability. In addition, the parameter of the 12-
month EURIBOR turns out to be significant with a positive influence on a firm’s
survival probability, too. The positive influence of the GDP can be explained by
the fact, that in a prosperous economic environment a lower number of firms fails
because inefficiencies regarding the business model are not punished instantly by
the market. The positive influence of the 12-month EURIBOR might be due to the
enhancing interest rate especially at the top of an economic upturn, induced by the
central banks in order to omit an overheating of the economy.
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4.2.2 Cure-Related Parameter Estimates of the CADM
Comparing the cure part of variant 1 with variant 2 one can see that the cure model
without sample correction would miss to identify the cure-relevant variable Long-
term Liabilities related to Total Capital. Furthermore, the estimated parameters
concerning the variables ln(Sales) and Long-term Provisions to Total Capital have
a much lower significance. Therefore, the sample selection in the model would miss
to identify a cure-relevant variable and lead to a weaker model, if not corrected
through the applied Heckman sample selection method. This is due to the fact that
the cure part of the model contains only observable information regarding a smaller
fraction of the evaluated firms in the data, because only defaulted firms can become
cured. The estimation of variant 2 is only based on the non-randomly selected small
sample of defaulted firms. Hence, the influence of the not-defaulted firms, which
indeed have a certain probability of default, is completely missed by the logistic
regression in variant 2. The applied bivariate Probit sample selection method of
variant 1 includes also the influence of the not-defaulted firms in order to omit a
sample selection bias, see Heckman (1976, 1979) and Boyes et al. (1989).
The probability of being cured in the evaluated model is solely depending on firm-
specific influence factors since the GDP and the 12-month EURIBOR are only sig-
nificant in the selection part. The estimated parameter for the variable ln(Total
Capital)is significant on the 1% level, the parameters for Long-term Liabilities to
Total Capital as well as the constant are significant on the 10% level and the param-
eters for the ln(Sales), the Current Liabilities and the Long-term Provisions to Total
Capital are significant on the 5% level. The ln(Total Capital) and the parameters
regarding the variables Current Liabilities, Long-term Liabilities and Long-term Pro-
visions to Total Capital have a negative influence on the probability of being cured,
while the ln(Sales) support a cure event. A relatively low debt position may enhance
the flexibility and be helpful for the restructuring of the credit agreements and thus
enhances the probability to cure a firm. This could be the reason for the negative
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influence of the variables Current and Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital. Fur-
thermore, one can assume that there was a good reason to undertake the provisions
concerning uncertain risks although not all risks are covered. If a firm has a high
financial risk potential due to court proceedings or charges then the probability of
being cured after a default event is very low. The restructuring of bigger firms might
be more complex. Usually, multiple lenders have to find common agreements. The
financial analysis as well as the implementation of a new strategy needs preparation
and time. Hence, cure attempts fail more often, which is indicated by the negative
influence of the ln(Total Capital), and this can be seen as a proxy for a firm’s size.
Another proxy for a firm’s size can be the ln(Sales). Concerning this variable bigger
firms tend to have a higher cure probability. This might be due to the fact that a
firm that is bigger than others concerning its sales might be an important player
in the market with some significant influence. Furthermore, firms with higher sales
might have a higher probability of being cured because even a slight cost reduction
during the restructuring phase would enhance instantly the margins and, therefore,
the profitability.
4.2.3 Influence of the Default Probability
The individual default probabilities for two firms regarding the CADM and the
DDM are shown in Figures 4 and 5 for two exemplary firms from the credit portfolio.
Firm A has on average a relative low default probability and firm B has on average
a relative high default probability. The one-year default probabilities are predicted
for the years 2003 to 2007 based on the known data of the years 2002 to 2006
that are applied in the two estimation methods. The default probabilities for firm
A are generally lower than those of firm B regarding all evaluated time periods.
This holds for both models. The CADM predicts a higher default probability than
the DDM for both firms. The difference between the default probabilities of the
models is increasing with the level of the predicted default probability. Firm A and
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Figure 4: Individual default probabilities of firm A regarding the CADM and DDM.
Predicted probabilities for the years 2003 to 2007.
Figure 5: Individual default probabilities of firm B regarding the CADM and DDM.
Predicted probabilities for the years 2003 to 2007.
B face a strong probability increase between 2003 and 2004 regarding the CADM.
The probability of default for firm A increases from 2.75% in 2003 to 4.6% in 2004
and for firm B from 4.8% to nearly 7.25%, respectively. The default probability of
the DDM shows the same behavior on a lower level and increases by nearly 40%.
After a significant default probability reduction regarding the year 2005 a second
increase can be seen for both firms and both models for the year 2006. The default
probabilities concerning the year 2007 are on a relative low level, between 0.1% and
0.3% for firm A and between 0.25% and 0.5% for firm B. The difference between
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Table 4: Distributions of the default probabilities regarding all firms in the credit
portfolio of the years 2003 to 2007. The default probabilities are displayed concerning
the CADM and the DDM. In addition, the CADM-related cure probabilities of all
defaulted firms in the different years are mentioned.
Arithmetic
Mean
Median 25% Quantil 75% Quantil
CADM Default Prob. 0.0457 0.0386 0.0253 0.0575
2003 Cure Prob. 0.6063 0.6108 0.5627 0.6554
DDM Default Prob. 0.0174 0.0147 0.0093 0.0218
CADM Default Prob. 0.0613 0.0529 0.0351 0.0758
2004 Cure Prob. 0.6184 0.6175 0.5601 0.6644
DDM Default Prob. 0.0234 0.0195 0.0123 0.0294
CADM Default Prob. 0.0293 0.0238 0.0150 0.0361
2005 Cure Prob. 0.6273 0.6251 0.5852 0.6665
DDM Default Prob. 0.0080 0.0066 0.0042 0.0101
CADM Default Prob. 0.0363 0.0298 0.0191 0.0443
2006 Cure Prob. 0.6134 0.5972 0.5722 0.6814
DDM Default Prob. 0.0142 0.0116 0.0073 0.0175
CADM Default Prob. 0.0064 0.0046 0.0025 0.0075
2007 Cure Prob. 0.6213 0.5988 0.5757 0.6381
DDM Default Prob. 0.0026 0.0021 0.0013 0.0032
the predicted default probabilities of the DDM and the CADM vanishes on this low
probability level. The general higher default probabilities in the CADM are due to
the fact that some of the defaulted firms face a cure event and, therefore, reduce the
number of defaulted firms in a further step while the DDM only predicts defaulted
firms that are not-cured afterwards.
The distributions of the default probabilities of the complete credit portfolio regar-
ding the DDM and the CADM are shown in Table 4. In addition, the CADM-related
cure probabilities of the defaulted firms are shown over the different time periods.
The predicted default and cure probabilities are based on the known data of the
years 2002 to 2006.
The development of the portfolio-based default probabilities in Table 4 is quite
similar to the already stated individual probabilities of firm A and firm B in Figure
5. The default probabilities concerning the CADM are generally on a significant
higher level than the probabilities of the DDM. From the year 2003 to 2004 an
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increase can be stated regarding both methods. The mean of the default probability
rises from 4.57% to 6.13% regarding the CADM and from 1.74% to 2.34% regarding
the DDM. In 2005 the mean reduces to 2.93% and 0.8%, respectively. In 2006 the
default probabilities are increasing once more to 3.63% and 1.42% regarding the
DDM. Finally in 2007 a sharp decrease can be stated. The mean reduces to 0.64%
concerning the CADM and to 0.26% concerning the DDM.
The CADM-related cure probabilities do not show the up- and downturns of the
default probabilities. The mean of the cure probabilities is at a constant range
between 61% and 63% over the different time periods. This indicates that on average
nearly two third of the defaulted firms can be cured. In addition, if one takes
the cure probabilities into account, the relative high difference between the default
probabilities concerning the two models nearly vanishes. Hence, the two models
are predicting nearly the same default probability on the “net” definite default
level. The main advantage of the CADM is that it enables a bank to identify which
firms will most likely be cured with no loss. For example, it could be better to
predict ten defaulted firms which can possibly be cured and it is known that the
two firms with the highest earning upside for the bank will most likely be cured
than to have five definitely defaulted firms with high and low earning upsides for
the bank and no option concerning the cure probabilities. The CADM generates on
average a 2.5 times higher default probability but it also presents a lot of additional
information concerning the defaulted firms as well as the chance of a cure event.
If the predicted defaults are reduced by the predicted cured firms, the defaults are
on nearly the same level. Hence, no additional loss is predicted but rather a lot
of additional information. A bank could use the cure probability concerning the
predicted defaults to ensure that the right ones will become cured. The bank gets
the information if a defaulted borrower with high earning prospects due to cross-sell
will probably become cured. This information allows “cherry picking” among the
defaulted firms and thus might enhance the earning prospects. Furthermore the
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“intensive care” performance can be measured directly and thus it can be optimized
in order to enhance the cure probabilities of all defaulted firms. The CADM ensures
a more detailed risk management and might enhance the earning upsides of a bank
because the cure probability of defaulted firms with high earning prospects is known
and individual treatments based on that information can be managed.
5 Conclusion
In this paper the Cure After Default Model is developed in order to incorporate
the possibility of a cure fraction in a credit default prediction model. The CADM
identifies different default probability and cure probability influencing variables and
uses the default- and cure-related information. The findings of the CADM are com-
pared to the Definite Default Model which treats the defaulted firms that are cured
as never defaulted and ignores cure-event-influencing risk drivers.
Concerning the Definite Default Model significant parameters are estimated regard-
ing the variables ln(Sales) and ln(Total Capital) as well as Gross Profit, Current
and Long-term Liabilities, Long-term Provisions and Equity to Total Capital and
the German GDP growth rate. Concerning the influence direction of the covariates,
with the exception of the additional variable Long-term Provisions to Total Capital
and the excluded 12-month EURIBOR, the findings are nearly equal to those of the
default model of the CADM. The CADM combines a default probability model with
a cure probability model. The parameter estimation concerning the cure probability
is done with a bivariate Probit sample selection model. Due to the included cure
probability model the firm-specific variable ln(Sales) can be identified as significant,
cure probability enhancing variable. The firm-specific variables Current and Long-
term Liabilities to Total Capital as well as Long-term Provisions to Total Capital
and the ln(Total Capital) can be identified with a strong negative influence on the
cure probability.
The findings indicate that the treatment of the possibility of being cured within
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a default prediction model has a significant influence on the default risk, hence it
seems to be very important for the risk management to incorporate the possibility of
being cured and its additional information into the credit risk modeling. The find-
ings and interpretations should sensibilize for potential future default risks through
their results.
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Modul III
Why does a Major Bank Cancel its Relationship
with a Borrowing Firm? Empirical Findings from
a Major Bank’s SME Credit Portfolio
Marcus Wolter
Daniel Ro¨sch
Working Paper
Abstract
In this paper we evaluate the resilience of the relationship between a lending
bank and its SME borrowers in a stressed situation. We focus on firms in a
credit portfolio which triggered a default event and investigate the interdepen-
dencies between the cancelation of the relationship and different qualitative
and quantitative influence factors. The findings are developed based on a
major bank’s credit portfolio that contains 5,930 mainly small- and medium-
sized German firms. A total of 1,243 default events are observed over a time
period from January 2002 to December 2007. Among the defaulted firms 144
relationships are canceled. The default reasons as well as the further deploy-
ment of the defaulted firms are documented in the database. We find that
the relationship is most likely canceled if the bank is convinced that it will
not get paid any more regarding its outstanding loans. On the other hand, if
the payment is only delayed for some time, a cancelation of the relationship
is less likely. Furthermore, the commitment of the firm’s owner, measured in
the equity quote, seems to be essential for the robustness of the relationship.
Also macroeconomic influence factors are identified. A low interest rate and
an economic upturn are in general a relationship-supporting environment.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A sustainable relationship between bank and borrower is the foundation for every
aspect of the cooperation. In a stable and intensive relationship both partners can
gain significant benefits. Based on different maintained long-term relationships a
bank can build a sophisticated credit risk expertise. With a sufficient information
history regarding several borrowers, the lender is capable of using this information
advantage in order to evaluate the general credit risk of the individual borrower,
see, e.g., Sharpe (1990). Also the borrower is capable of generating significant ad-
vantages based on a strong relationship with the bank. Reliable funding should
enable sustainable financing and hence reduce risks of mid- and long-term projects.
In addition, a firm might benefit from the bank’s information advantage in credit
risk evaluation, for example, through lower interest payments and reduced collateral
requirements in long-term relationships, see Berger and Udell (1995).
Furthermore, a maintained and intensive relationship is a key aspect for the bank
to reach several additional earning upsides, for example, due to cross-sell potential.
Predominantly the relationship is first established based on a loan agreement and
later the bank attempts to collect not only earnings due to the credit line but also on
fee-based products that are free from credit risk and thus have a significant leverage
on the earning prospects, see La Torre et al. (2010).
The importance of the relationship is further displayed by the fact that in the case
of a default event regarding a borrower, this situation does not necessarily lead to
a cancelation of the relationship. As we will see, several defaulted firms have main-
tained their relationship with the bank and can get cured afterwards. Furthermore,
if the business relationship between a bank and a specific borrower is strong enough
to cope with the special situation of a default event while other bank partners might
have to reduce their exposure or cut the relationship with the firm, new oppor-
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tunities might be available for the involved partners. A strong relationship might
support the exchange of information regarding the special challenge of surrender-
ing in a financial struggle and ease the path towards resurrection. In addition, a
new potential yield due to higher interest concerning the restructured loans or more
cross-sell could be generated. New cross-sell prospects might be created, for exam-
ple, because of the customer’s desire to reduce operative risks, such as commodity
price risks or interest risks, with derivative products, see Berlin (1996).
On the contrary, a relationship cancelation negates the possibility of a defaulted firm
to become cured with no loss for the bank and eliminates all above-named potential
benefits. Furthermore, in the case of relationship cancelation the bank’s accumu-
lated soft information regarding the borrower is probably lost, see Berger and Udell
(2002). Hence, it should be in the interest of both partners, the bank as well as
the borrower, to maintaining the relationship. This leads to the question of which
occurrences initiate such a hard step as a cancelation of the relationship. While
the maintained relationship and its influence on lender and borrower is extensively
evaluated in the relationship lending literature, the framework of influence factors
that might support or prevent the cancelation of the relationship between a lending
major bank and borrowing small- and medium-sized firms in a stressed situation
has only been scarcely elucidated in this research area, see Elyasiani and Goldberg
(2004).
One predominant assumption in the relationship lending literature is that major
banks are reluctant to establish a relationship with SMEs due to the diffuse infor-
mation policy of these customers. The high standardization level in major banks
seems to conflict with the necessary individuality level concerning SMEs relation-
ships. Hence, predominantly small regional banks with flexible and short decision-
making processes are present in this market niche, see Berger and Udell (1998) and
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004). In this paper, an SME credit portfolio regarding a
major German bank is evaluated. The existence of this evaluated data already indi-
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cates that larger, international-operating banks are also interested in relationships
with SMEs. We evaluate the dependencies of a relationship cancelation with several
other qualitative factors, for example, delayed payments or provision building and
quantitative factors from the firm’s financial statements, for example, the quotes of
equity or liabilities. We focus on cancelations in stressed situations in order to eva-
luate the robustness-influencing factors of the relationship. A stressed situation is
defined as a situation where the borrowing firm has triggered a default event. Data
concerning defaulted firms are rare and predominantly only known to banks. The
database in this paper includes a total of 1,243 default events and 144 relationship
cancelations among the evaluated firms. Concerning the defaulted firms, besides the
default reason also the further deployment is available. The full information data is
available concerning 886 defaulted firms and 104 relationship cancelations.
The database contains a great deal of information over the whole cross-section con-
cerning German SMEs. It is not preselected, which means that it includes every
firm that is a Dresdner Bank1 customer and whose financial data is listed in a risk
program necessary for a loan decision. Hence, the database can be seen as repre-
sentative for a typical major bank credit portfolio of German SMEs. Contrary to,
for example, US American SMEs, German SMEs are predominantly not listed on
a stock market and are rather reluctant to divulge financial information. Exter-
nal financing is mostly accomplished through bank loans, see Deutsche Bundesbank
(2010).
In the following sections, first an overview regarding the literature and the main
contributions of our paper are given. Second, the model is described, followed by
the estimation process. After that some descriptive statistics concerning the ba-
lance sheet data as well as further relationship-cancelation-related information of
the SME in the evaluated credit portfolio are shown. Finally, the empirical findings
concerning the significant influence factors are described, followed by a conclusion.
1The firm-specific data were provided by Dresdner Bank AG in spring 2008. Dresdner Bank
was acquired by Commerzbank AG in summer 2008.
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1.2 Literature Review
The relationship lending literature evaluates a wide range of influence factors and
impacts concerning the concurrence regarding borrowers and lenders. A prevalent
argument is that relationship lending is applied by banks in order to evaluate firms
with reluctant information policies concerning their credit worthiness. These bor-
rowers are predominantly small and medium-sized enterprises. The necessary infor-
mation concerning the SME has to be gathered individually over a relatively long
period regarding each individual borrower. Hence, small regional banks with flexible
and short decision-making processes should have an advantage in this market niche,
see Berger and Udell (1996, 1998).
Recent literature stated that larger banks are also increasingly interested in rela-
tionship lending and thoroughly capable of producing significant value regarding
the SME market. For example, Berger and Udell (2006) showed that larger banks
do not necessarily have a comparative disadvantage concerning relationship lend-
ing compared to small, regional banks. The strategic position depends mainly on
the used lending technology and internal organization. The impact of changes in
the banking industry on the relationship lending, for example, due to consolidation,
technological advancement or a change of regulatory conditions are evaluated by
Berger and Udell (2002). They found that small banks have an advantage in rela-
tionship banking due to their lower hierarchical structure and clearer organization.
In the case of mergers the advantage vanishes with increasing size and new smaller
banks take the place of the market.
La Torre et al. (2010) found, based on the evaluation of small, medium-sized and ma-
jor banks in 12 countries, that all kinds of banks are increasingly serving SME bor-
rowers with relationship lending, because of potential cross-sell regarding fee-based
financial products. Furthermore, bigger financial institutions can gain upsides due
to economies of scale and scope. The increasing competition in the banking market
and its influence on the relationship lending was evaluated by Boot and Thakor
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(2000). They stated that in the case of a fast development of the banking industry
with increasing competitive pressure among the operating banks, relationship len-
ding is being focused on more. On the contrary, increasing competition in the bond
market is reducing the appearance of relationship lending.
Credit default events are predominantly mentioned indirectly in the relationship
lending literature. Berlin (1996) found that for small, medium-sized and large firms
in financial distress a strong relationship is supportive concerning the probability of
resurrection. If these firms do not only rely on private lending based on relationship
but also on public financing they have a lot more problems in the restructuring
phase, due to reluctant bank partners. James (1996) showed that the success of the
restructuring process depends mainly on the bank’s participation intensity as well
as the capital structure regarding public and private claims.
The value of the relationship between borrower and lender was, for example, evalu-
ated in Fama (1985). It is shown that borrowers are willing to pay higher interests for
relationship lending than for financing alternatives on the public market. Petersen
and Rajan (1994) found that a close relationship between borrower and lender is
connected with a significant value. Furthermore, if more than one lender is included,
the interest rates tend to go up while the availability of credit lines is shortened.
Sharpe (1990) showed that banks have an information advantage due to the cumu-
lated loan market information regarding the history of their long-term customers.
They can generate significant rents from this information asymmetry, see Schenone
(2010). Furthermore, Stanton (2002) showed that a bank’s profitability can be en-
hanced if the relationship lending is focused on larger credit exposures.
The long-term history of different borrowers allows a bank to calculate sophisticated
ratings and evaluate the individual credit risks, see Machauer and Weber (1998).
The asymmetric information was also evaluated by Dass and Massa (2011), based
on empirical information concerning US American firms. They found, that with
increasing relationship intensity, measured by loan size and insider potential of the
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bank, not only the information advantage of the lender is increasing but also the
corporate governance of the borrower is improving. In addition, the information
advantage, which can be achieved by relationship lending, can generate a positive
signaling effect regarding third parties. For example, James and Wier (1990) found
that an established borrowing relationship between a bank and a firm can generate
a significant valuation upside if the firm offers stocks on a public market during an
initial public offering.
The length of the engagement is also a widely discussed area in the relationship
literature, but with different and sometimes divergent findings. For example, De-
gryse and van Cayseele (2000) found, based on information concerning European
banks and SMEs, that the duration has an enhancing effect on the interest rate and
simultaneously an decreasing effect on collateral. A contrary influence is found con-
cerning the scope of the relationship, which is measured in other financial products
that are connected with sensitive information. Then again, for example, Berger and
Udell (1995) and Brick and Palia (2007) showed that borrowers pay lower interest
rates with enhancing duration of the relationship. Furthermore, with increasing re-
lationship time the necessary collateral is decreasing.
The relationship lending is predominantly evaluated among banks and corporations
in the Anglo-Norman area. Nevertheless, some work was also carried out concerning
the German banking industry: for example, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Elsas
(2005) evaluated the relevant determinants of relationship lending between German
universal banks and SMEs. Their main focus was on the evaluation of the so-called
“Hausbank” status, a position where a bank is one of the most important bank part-
ners for the firm. They found that the “Hausbank” status does not depend on the
length of the relationship but rather on the number of bank relationships that the
firm has as well as the total credit exposure of the respective bank. Furthermore, it
was shown that the “Hausbank” is a reliable financing partner also in the case of a
negative rating development of the respective firm. These findings were also found
70
by Lehmann and Neuberger (2001). In addition, Lehmann and Neuberger (2001)
evaluated the social behavior and interaction between the acting persons on both
sides. They found that this social effect significantly influences the availability and
conditions of the loans.
A general overview concerning the relationship lending literature can be found in
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004).
1.3 Main Contributions
If a firm’s loan funding is not done by a broker through a single transaction but
instead provided by a financial intermediary, for example a bank, which has a close
and maintaining business connection, then it is a matter of relationship lending,
see Boot and Thakor (2000). A huge part of the relationship literature is focused
on maintaining relationships in normal situations. A great deal of work was done
concerning the influence of relationship lending on interest rates, credit availabi-
lity, ratings, collateral, firm value etc., see, e.g., Fama (1985), Elsas (2005), Sharpe
(1990), James and Wier (1990) or Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004).
The strong connection between the bank and the borrowing firm regarding rela-
tionship lending is not only based on quantitative information that can be found,
for example, in a firm’s financial statements, but also soft facts about the borrower
are available in a close relationship. Those soft facts are a relevant information
resource for a bank. Few papers evaluated this qualitative information, which can
be accumulated by the bank concerning the borrower over a longer time horizon
such as social influence factors or the behavior of the acting persons on both sides,
see Berger and Udell (2002) and Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004). In addition, the
relationship in a distressed situation has rarely been focused on, perhaps due to the
scarcer data concerning defaulted firms. The influence of the relationship on the
restructuring process among firms in financial distress was, for example, evaluated
by James (1996) and Berlin (1996). The research in this area is mainly based on
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the availability of loans in the refinancing process.
Our paper focuses on both scarcely evaluated research areas. We elucidate a frame-
work around the relationship between a major bank and its SME borrower and focus
on quantitative as well as soft qualitative influence factors that might support or
destroy the relationship in a stressed situation. Hence, we ask the question of un-
der which circumstances a bank cancels the relationship regarding a defaulted SME
borrower. In addition, we shift the focus from loan availability to the identification
of relevant influence factors concerning the robustness of the individual relationship
itself. Our findings regarding this question are straightforward: We find a qual-
itative and quantitative framework of influence factors which, depending on their
occurrence, can support a maintaining relationship or lead to a cancelation of the
relationship. The qualitative factors are in turn related to the bank’s valuation of
future earning prospects: delayed payments are tolerated, whereas the cancelation
of interest payment is most likely followed by the cancelation of the relationship.
Furthermore, the quantitative variable Equity to Total Capital indicates that a high
commitment of the firm’s owner generally supports the relationship. In addition, it
is shown that a low interest rate and an economic upturn, measured by the 3-month
EURIBOR and the one-year growth rate of the German GDP, enhance the pro-
bability of a relationship being maintained between the bank and its borrower in a
stressed situation. Our findings indicate that the knowledge of the bank concerning
the individual borrower leads to a specific tolerance level concerning the on-time
payment of interests, in particular when the owner is also involved with a relatively
high amount of equity. Although a 90-day-delayed-payment triggers a default event,
the lender often accepts the delayed payment and does not apply a hard cut. As
long as there is certainty that the interest will be payed the relationship is not in
danger. This holds even more during macroeconomic environments with low interest
rates and high economic growth.
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2 The Relationship Model
2.1 Model Construction
In this paper we evaluate influence factors regarding the cancelation of the relation-
ship between a major bank and an SME borrower. Our focus is not on amicable
cancelations by both partners, but rather on cancelations by the bank in stressed
situations. A stressed situation is defined as a situation in which the borrower
triggered a default reason. Since we focus on those firms where a default event
is triggered, the evaluated cancelation-specific data are only observable among the
small sample of defaulted firms. A simple linear regression could be done among
the defaulted firms in order to find dependencies between the relationship cancela-
tion and potential influence factors. However, this approach would only incorporate
the small sample of firms that triggered a default reason and it would ignore the
remaining not-defaulted firms in the credit portfolio. Since the not-defaulted firms
also have a certain default probability based on macroeconomic and firm-specific
risk drivers, the exclusion of these firms would neglect their influence and might
generate a sample selection bias, see Heckman (1976, 1979).
We apply a certain variant of the Heckman model to solve the supposed problem
of sample selection bias. In general, the Heckman model consists of two dependent
variables and their corresponding parameters are estimated via a linear equation.
The first variable is applied to incorporate the influence regarding the complete
available sample, hence in our case, all firms in the SME credit portfolio. This
sample consists of firms that are not-defaulted as well as the defaulted ones. In
our case, the first variable is represented by the binary variable dit which indicates
through the outcome 0, if the firm i (i = 1, . . . , N) is not-defaulted in time period t
(t = 1, . . . , T ) and through the outcome 1, if the firm i is defaulted in time period
t. Since also the not-defaulted firms have a certain default probability they have
to be considered with this individual probability concerning the regression among
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the defaulted firms. Through the occurrence of a default event concerning a specific
firm, this firm is selected in the smaller sample of defaulted firms. Only among the
sample of defaulted firms are the evaluated cancelation-specific variables observable.
Here the second dependent variable, rcit is applied. Since we want to evaluate, which
influence factors significantly influence the cancelation of the relationship between
the bank and the borrower in a stressed situation, we have to make a regression
concerning the depending variable relationship cancelation and the data among the
defaulted firms we are interested in. The second regression can only be done if the
firm is defaulted, hence, only if dit has the outcome 1, because the evaluated data
is predominantly only observable among the reduced sample of defaulted firms. In
that case, the relationship cancelation can be evaluated. In our case, the variable,
rcit is also a binary one and indicates with the outcome 1 if the relationship between
the borrower i is canceled in period t or if the relationship of borrower i and the
bank is still maintained in period t.
In order to introduce the influencing risk drivers in the estimation, the following
regressions are done:
d∗it = α
Hd · xHdi,t−1 + uHdit (1)
rc∗it = α
Hrc · xHrci,t−1 + uHrcit , if dit = 1, (2)
where d∗it and rc
∗
it are not-observable metric variables that depend on the value of
the evaluated, significant default-related and relationship-related risk drivers, re-
spectively. αHd and αHrc are parameter vectors for the related covariates to be esti-
mated. The state matrix xHdi,t−1 contains several one-year time-lagged default-related
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk drivers. The state matrix xHrci,t−1 contains se-
veral one-year time-lagged relationship-related firm-specific and macroeconomic risk
drivers. uHdit and u
Hrc
it are the residual error terms. The error terms are jointly nor-
mally distributed with a mean of 0, a standard deviation of 1 and a correlation ρH .
The standard Heckman model states that if the not-observable metric variable d∗it
falls below a specific threshold, the observable indicator dit has the outcome 0 and
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1 otherwise:
dit =

1 if d∗it > 0
0 if d∗it ≤ 0
(3)
In the standard Heckman model the second dependent variable is assumed to be
a metric one. Nevertheless, in our evaluated model rcit is also a binary variable,
because its outcome is 1 if the relationship between the bank and the individual
firm is canceled and 0 if it is not-canceled. Hence, the standard Heckman model is
not appropriate for the case of two binary variables and we have to use a slightly
modified model variant. We use a bivariate Probit sample selection model to handle
the estimation, see Lee et al. (2004), Greene (1998) and Boyes et al. (1989). If a
default event occurs, indicated by dit = 1, rcit is an observable binary indicator
regarding the status of the relationship between the bank and the borrower that
has the outcome 0 if the not-observable metric variable rc∗it falls below a specific
threshold and 1 otherwise:
rcit =

1 if rc∗it > 0 and dit = 1
0 if rc∗it ≤ 0 and dit = 1
(4)
The default-related risk drivers and the relationship-related variables are simultane-
ously identified within the estimation of the bivariate Probit sample selection model,
see Boyes et al. (1989).
2.2 Estimation of the Model Parameters
In the applied bivariate Probit selection model the outcome of the dependent vari-
ables is either 0 or 1. Consequently, three combinations are possible: the firm is
not-defaulted (dit = 0), the firm is defaulted and the relationship is not-canceled
(dit = 1 and rcit = 0) as well as the case of a defaulted firm with canceled relation-
ship (dit = 1 and rcit = 1). Hence, the following probabilities are possible:
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1. Firm i does not default in time period t:
Pr (dit = 0) = 1− Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
)
(5)
2. Firm i defaults in time period t and the relationship is not-canceled:
Pr (dit = 1, rcit = 0) = Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
)
−φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHrc · xHrci,t−1, ρH
)
(6)
3. Firm i defaults in time period t and the relationship is canceled:
Pr (dit = 1, rcit = 1) = φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHrc · xHrci,t−1, ρH
)
. (7)
Φ indicates the cumulative distribution function for the standardized univariate
normal distribution. φ indicates the cumulative distribution function of the stan-
dardized bivariate normal distribution with the correlation denoted by ρH , see Boyes
et al. (1989). The above-named probabilities lead to the likelihood of the sample se-
lection model. It can be written, conditional on the evaluated covariates, as follows:
L =
T∏
t=1
Nt∏
i=1
(
1− Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
))1−dit ·
(
Φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1
)
− φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHrc · xHrci,t−1, ρH
))dit·(1−rcit) ·(
φ
(
αHd · xHdi,t−1, αHrc · xHrci,t−1, ρH
))dit·rcit
. (8)
The variables for the state matrix xHdi,t−1 consist of one-year time-lagged default-
related firm-specific and macroeconomic risk drivers. The state matrix for the
relationship-related variables, xHrci,t−1, consist of the evaluated one-year time-lagged
quantitative firm-specific and macroeconomic risk drivers as well as different quali-
tative firm-specific risk drivers. A quasi-Newton-Raphson algorithm is used for the
maximization of the likelihood function, see Lee et al. (2004), Greene (1998) and
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Boyes et al. (1989). The 144 observed relationship cancelations are reduced to 104
observed relationship cancelations due to missing data. The estimations are done
simultaneous with the QLIM procedure of the statistic program SAS.
2.3 Evaluated Risk Drivers and Expected Influences
The evaluated information concerning the default probability part of the model is
the logarithmized sales and the logarithmized total capital as well as the quotes
gross profit, long-term liabilities, current liabilities and equity in relation to the to-
tal capital. The default-related influence of different firm-specific information from
the firm’s financial statement as well as the balance sheet data have been evaluated
several times since the credit-scoring models were invented by Altman (1968) and
Ohlson (1980). The evaluated macroeconomic data is the 3-month EURIBOR and
the annual growth rate of the German GDP. The influence of interest rates and the
GDP growth on the default probability was, for example, evaluated by Duffie et al.
(2007).
Regarding the influence direction of the evaluated default-related variables, we
assume a default-probability-reducing effect concerning the firm-specific variable
Gross Profit to Total Capital and Equity to Total Capital as well as the macroeco-
nomic variable GDP and a default-probability-enhancing effect regarding the vari-
able Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital and Current Liabilities to Total Capital.
Concerning the variables ln(Sales) and ln(Total Capital) as well as the 3-month EU-
RIBOR both influence directions are ex ante seen as possible.
The evaluated information concerning the relationship cancelation part of the model
are the quantitative firm-specific and macroeconomic data and qualitative infor-
mation concerning the development of the defaulted firms. The evaluated quali-
tative data include the specification Free-of-interest state, Payment-unlikely, Non-
accrued, 90-day-delayed-payment, Bankruptcy, Troubled-debt-restructuring, Depre-
ciation, Settlement, Specific-provision and Provision. Those variables are binary,
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hence they have the outcome 0 if they are not observed and 1 if they occur as a
default trigger or after the triggered default, respectively. These variables do not
necessarily lead to the cancelation of the relationship, but they are supposed to
influence the relationship between the bank and the borrower. Qualitative influ-
ence factors in the relationship lending were, for example, evaluated by Berger and
Udell (2002) and Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004). Concerning the influence direction
of the qualitative variables, we assume a negative influence on the relationship re-
garding Bankruptcy and Troubled-debt-restructuring because these states indicate
a heavy disturbance of the firm’s financial health with direct, most likely negative,
influence on the relationship. On the contrary, the variable 90-day-delayed-payment
is not necessary connected with deeper problems and might even be generated out
of a firm’s carelessness. Hence, this variable might be a minor default trigger and
should predominantly be found in the relationship maintaining defaults. It is as-
sumed to have a positive influence. Concerning the other qualitative variables no
specific influence direction is assumed. In addition, the quantitative firm-specific
and macroeconomic variables of the selection part are also evaluated in the relation-
ship cancelation part of the model. We thereby assume ex ante that the variables,
which have a default-probability-reducing effect, have a positive influence on the re-
lationship. Quantitative influence factors are evaluated in the relationship literature
by Berger and Udell (1998) and Brick and Palia (2007). In addition, we evaluate
some credit-amount-related information, because several literature states a signifi-
cant dependence between the total credit amount and the relationship lending, for
example, see Stanton (2002) and Petersen and Rajan (1994). The credit-amount-
related information is: the total value of long-term liabilities, the total value of
current liabilities, the sum of the total value of long-term and current liabilities,
the logarithmized total value of long-term liabilities, the logarithmized total value
of current liabilities and the logarithmized sum of the total value of long-term and
current liabilities. Concerning the size of the exposure no specific influence direction
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is expected ex ante. A high exposure is often connected with a more sophisticated
evaluation of the firm and a larger number of involved persons regarding the bank’s
decision making which might lead to a better information exchange and a deeper
understanding of the firm’s situation. In addition, when a high credit exposure is
at stake, the bank might be more interested in an active role within the restruc-
turing process. This might support a maintained relationship. On the contrary,
a high exposure with delayed or canceled payments generates a lot of opportunity
costs. If the bank was to annul the relationship, take the money and invest it in the
credit market, it might be better of. Hence, the bigger the exposure, the bigger the
opportunity costs and a cancelation might become more likely.
3 Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Origin of the Database
All evaluated firm-specific data were provided in anonymous form by Dresdner Bank
AG in spring 2008. The database contains balance sheet and profit and loss infor-
mation from 23,894 financial statements. The evaluated time period was 01.01.2002
to 31.12.2007. A total number of 5,930 German firms are observed as well as 1,243
default events. Regarding the defaulted firms, information concerning the default
reason and the further deployment in the bank is available. The firms in the port-
folio are spread over a wide range of different branches and almost all firms are not
listed on a stock exchange. Only financial data from individual financial statements
are observed. The financial statements are explicitly not evaluated in a consolidated
form: Since every triggered default event by a single firm is instantly connected at
least with some certain kind of bureaucratic effort for the lender, it is not relevant
if a potential mother firm could cure the default reason after some time.
Regarding the financial statements, information is available concerning: branch,
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sales, EBITDA2, EBITA3, gross profit, net profit, current liabilities, long-term lia-
bilities, long-term provisions, equity, fixed assets as well as current assets. Regarding
the financial statements, only data that is available for a 12-month time period are
applied. Hence, shortened financial years and opening balance sheets are excluded.
If one firm has triggered several default events at different time intervals, the first-
mentioned default is used as the relevant one.
3.2 Balance Sheet Information
In the following tables descriptive statistics concerning the firm-specific variables
are presented in order to elucidate the major bank’s SME portfolio.
In Tables 1 to 3 the arithmetic mean, the median as well as the 25%- and the 75%-
quantile of the respective variable are shown for every year in thousands of euros.
In addition, the total number of observed firms on which the average values rely is
mentioned for each of the six years. The highest number of firms is observed within
the first two years 2002 and 2003 with a total of 4,771, while within the year 2007
with a total of 2,706 the lowest number of firms is observed. Changes in the total
number of observed firms appear due to default events and censoring. There are
also possible changes due to missing data.4 Over all time periods from 2002 to 2007
a total of 1,243 default events were observed. The average value of the respective
variables over the complete time series is shown in Table 4. The data shown in this
table rely on the average values concerning all of the mentioned 5,930 firms in the
database, thus resulting in positions after the decimal point. This is due to the fact
that the variables in the database are mentioned in units of a thousand euros while
Table 4 refers to average values concerning a various number of years.
2Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
3Earnings before interest, taxes and amortization.
4The 4,471 observed firms in the years 2002 and 2003 are not necessarily the same. There are
definitely some firms that are mentioned in 2002 and where financial statements are missing in
2003 as well as there are firms mentioned the first time in 2003. The total number of observed
financial statements in 2002 is 4,529 and in 2003 it is 4,518. Due to incomplete data 58 financial
statements are excluded in 2002 and 47 in the year 2003.
80
Table 1: Average value of the observed variables from the financial statements of the
years 2002 and 2003 in thousand euros (Nt = Number of observed firms within the
respective year t)
Variable N2002 = 4, 471 N2003 = 4, 471
Arithm. 25%- Median 75%- Arithm. 25%- Median 75%-
Mean quantile Quantile Mean Quantile Quantile
Sales 57,093 2,879 12,464 35,572 70,374 3,014 13,081 38,658
EBITDA 2,739 60 541 2,112 3,115 75 605 2,192
EBITA 1,056 -54 225 1,082 1,295 -32 265 1,198
Gross profit 4,224 -18 201 1,228 2,785 2 262 1,395
Net profit 3,093 -1 94 751 1,423 0 123 837
Current 26,559 1,463 4,233 12,213 28,377 1,507 4,347 12,460
liabilities
Long-term 12,920 0 852 4,047 11,292 0 704 3,757
liabilities
Long-term 4,960 0 88 918 5,600 0 100 982
provisions
Equity 16,699 169 1,194 5,353 18,806 216 1,431 6,029
Fixed assets 33,228 475 2,501 9,937 33,320 489 2,639 10,614
Current assets 25,435 1,411 4,774 14,050 28,941 1,422 4,741 14,150
Table 2: Average value of the observed variables from the financial statements of the
years 2004 and 2005 in thousand euros (Nt = Number of observed firms within the
respective year t)
Variable N2004 = 4, 237 N2005 = 4, 382
Arithm. 25%- Median 75%- Arithm. 25%- Median 75%-
Mean Quantile Quantile Mean quantile Quantile
Sales 99,490 3,309 14,430 43,811 78,789 3,234 13,964 42,499
EBITDA 5,479 108 725 2,657 4,679 103 697 2,527
EBITA 3,581 1 388 1,606 2,798 5 373 1,588
Gross profit 5,325 40 455 1,978 4,825 58 485.5 2,050
Net profit 1.594 0 237 1,171 2,453 5 240 1,210
Current 37,105 1,506 4,471 13,017 31,083 1,444 4,238 12,452
liabilities
Long-term 12,215 0 506 3,211 11,137 0 409 2,884
liabilities
Long-term 7,608 0 121 1,064 6,191 0 98 972
provisions
Equity 24,386 281 1,708 6,862 19,412 318 1,738 6,939
Fixed assets 41,162 454 2,595 10,922 37,448 415 2,366 10,055
Current assets 48,065 1,440 5,238 15,203 29,215 1,429 4,999 14,874
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Table 3: Average value of the observed variables from the financial statements of the
years 2006 and 2007 in thousand euros (Nt = Number of observed firms within the
respective year t)
Variable N2006 = 3, 627 N2007 = 2, 706
Arithm. 25%- Median 75%- Arithm. 25%- Median 75%-
Mean Quantile Quantile Mean Quantile Quantile
Sales 122,495 3,961 16,923 49,036 147,715 5,790 21,796 62,294
EBITDA 5,873 170 873 3,128 6,311 254 1,148 4,012
EBITA 2,902 29 485 1,955 2,216 67 700 2,666
Gross profit 4,437 86 627 2,598 2,628 102 830 3,222
Net profit 2,100 15 361 1,612 567 13 451 1,963
Current 47,382 1,613 5,077 14,202 55,414 2,226 6,430 17,428
liabilities
Long-term 12,973 0 450 3,156 16,509 0 565 3,659
liabilities
Long-term 7,761 0 109 1,054 8,149 0 135 1,158
provisions
Equity 30,217 396 2,063 8,030 35,744 559 2,652 9,220
Fixed assets 49,040 503 2,735 10,384 56,710 724 3,439 11,975
Current assets 47,544 1,763 5,966 17,277 57,095 2,436 7,663 20,795
Table 4: Average value of the observed variables of all firms during the complete time
period from 2002 to 2007 in thousand euros (N = 5, 930, Number of observed firms
within the complete time period)
Variable Arithm. Mean 25%-Quantile Median 75%-Quantile
Sales 93,311 2,870 12,667 36,867
EBITDA 4,421 77 571 2,141
EBITA 2,222 -13 261 1,230
Gross profit 4,124 4 282 1,524
Net profit 1,461 0 145 882
Current liabilities 35,890 1,522 4,338 12,314
Long-term liabilities 11,625 12 731 3,436
Long-term provisions 6,663 0 91 853
Equity 23,142 214 1,369 5,840
Fixed assets 38,225 434 2.371 9.698
Current assets 38,349 1,372 4,711 14,132
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The sales median of the firms fluctuates between 12.5 and 14.5 million euros in the
years 2002 to 2005 and enhances in the following years up to 17 and accordingly 22
million euros. The all-year average is located around 13 million euros with a 25%-
quantile of 3 million euros and accordingly 37 million euros at the 75%-quantile.
Concerning the sales-specific definition of the German Federal Statistical Office the
observed firms belong on average to the division of small and medium-sized enter-
prises of the German economy.5 Small and medium-sized enterprises are playing
an important role in the German economy and politics. In this division 50% of all
German employees are located, see Jung (2010). The strong increase in sales within
the years 2006 and 2007 is a clear indicator for the enhanced business activity in the
German SME division during the economic upturn and thus underlines its impor-
tance for the German economy. It should be mentioned that during the calculation
of the average values the first years gain a lot of influence because of their high
number of observed firms within the observed portfolios.
The EBITDA median is growing constantly over the years from 0.5 million up to 1.2
million euros, except for the years 2004 and 2005 when it remains nearly constant.
The behavior of the EBITA median is analogous: it increases from 0.2 up to 0.7
million euros. Similar behavior can be stated for the gross profit and the net profit
medians which increase from 0.2 million up to 0.8 million and accordingly from 0.1
million up to 0.5 million euros. If one calculates the gross profit/sales ratio it can be
seen that the average rate of return enhances over the years from 1.6% up to 3.8%.
This might be an indicator that in an economic upturn significant higher margins
can be achieved in the markets.
The median concerning the current liabilities has a value around 4.3 million euros
during the first four years and increases in the years 2006 and 2007 up to 5.1 million
and accordingly to 6.4 million euros. On average the median has a value of 4.3
million, see Table 4. Concerning the long-term liabilities the median reduces during
the periods 2002 to 2005 from around 0.9 million down to 0.4 million euros and in-
5Sales-specific definition SME: 2 to 50 million euro.
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creases in the following two years up to 0.6 million euros. The long-term provision’s
median alternates during the complete time horizon between 90 thousand and 140
thousand euros. Noticeable also is the fact, that during the time periods over 25%
of the firms possess long-term liability and long-term provision values of zero euros.
The equity position of the firms is improving during the observed time periods. The
median increases from an initial 1.2 million up to 2.7 million euros. The average
value lies at 1.4 million euros.
Both the fixed assets’ median and the median of the current assets are fluctuating
around 2.5 million and accordingly 5 million euros during the time periods from
2002 to 2005. Within the year 2006 the values grow to 2.7 million and 6 million
euros and finally reach 3.4 million and accordingly 7.7 million euros in the year 2007.
The average values over the complete time period are located at 2.4 million and 4.7
million euros.
3.3 Default Deployment
Default events are observed concerning 1,243 firms in the credit portfolio in the
time period from January 2002 to December 2007. In the year 2002 no default is
observable in the database. The first defaults are observed in January 2003, be-
cause the bank’s risk and accounting system was activated at the turn of the year
2002/2003. A total of 2,779 years of balance sheet data are counted among the
defaulted firms, while 21,115 years of balance sheet data are available regarding the
4,687 not-defaulted firms. Five possible specifications regarding the firm’s further
deployment after the default are mentioned in the data: the firms that are resur-
rected without any loss for the bank are referred to Cured, Write-off means that
some part or all of the exposure had to be expensed, Worked-out indicates that the
securities had to be disposed to cover the outstanding liabilities and Distressed-sold
means that the loans had been sold with a certain haircut. The fifth specification
is Unknown, which means that the further development after the default event is
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not definitely known. In the database 333 firms are Cured, 269 are Write-off, 244
are Unknown, 239 are Worked-out and 158 are mentioned as Distressed-sold. The
stated facts are shown in Table 5.
It should be mentioned, that a defaulted firm with a canceled relationship cannot
get cured afterwards.
3.4 Default Reasons
In Table 6 the evaluated default reasons are shown with their number of occurrences
among the defaulted firms. The default reason is known for 1,017 defaulted firms.
Multiple reasons can be mentioned concerning a single default event.
The cancelation of the relationship between the bank and its borrower is mentioned
144 times among the defaulted firms. The occurrence is mentioned as Relationship-
cancelation. The specification Free-of-interest-state means that the defaulted firm
does not pay any interest on its outstanding loans. Payment-unlikely is not a hard
fact, it is rather an assessment of the bank concerning the loan and interest re-
payment probability of a defaulted firm. If some of the amortization and interest
payments regarding a loan are delayed the specification Non-accrued is used. More
than 89 days in delayed payment results is mentioned by the specification 90-day-
delayed-payment. If some problems concerning the restructuring of the outstanding
loans are observable, the specification is Troubled-debt-restructuring. The findings
Table 5: Specification status of all firms in the database with the total number of annual
financial statements for each of the specifications.
Specification Number of Firms Number of Balance Sheet Years
Cured 333 688
Write-off 269 635
Unknown 244 675
Worked-out 239 481
Distressed-sold 158 300
No default 4,687 21,115
Sum 5,930 23,894
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Table 6: Default reasons of the defaulted firms in the database with the individual
percentage among the defaulted firms and the total number of observed relationship
cancelations per observed specification.
Default Reason Number of
Occurrences
Percentage
among the
Defaulted Firms
Observed
Cancelations
Percentage of
the Canceled
Relationships
Relationship-cancelation 144 11.59 144 100.00
Free-of-interest-state 238 19.15 143 99.31
Payment-unlikely 58 4.67 0 0.00
Non-accrued 115 9.25 16 11.11
90-day-delayed-payment 35 2.82 8 5.56
Troubled-debt-restructuring 9 0.72 0 0.00
Bankruptcy 1 0.08 0 0.00
Settlement 238 19.15 144 100.00
Depreciation 2 0.16 0 0.00
Specific-provision 562 45.21 94 65.28
Provision 236 18.99 12 8.33
concerning this specification should be interpreted with caution, because it is only
observable 9 times. This holds also for the depreciation of a borrowers loan and the
firms filing for bankruptcy since the specification Depreciation is mentioned only
twice and Bankruptcy is mentioned only once. If a troubled credit agreement is
only partly repaid or the reclamation of collateral is mentioned, the status is called
Settlement. If the single credit of a defaulted borrower is reduced in its mentioned
value, due to credit-risk-related valuation methods, this is recognized by Specific-
provision. A general provision building for expected losses due to a troubled credit
arrangement is mentioned by the specification Provision.
One can see that most of the relationship cancelations are observable among Free-of-
interest-state, Settlement and Specific-provisions. Furthermore, all of the observed
relationship cancelations are also connected with Settlement, hence a total of 94
maintained relationships have the status Settlement. The specifications Payment-
unlikely, Troubled-debt-restructuring, Bankruptcy and Depreciation are all only ob-
served among maintained relationships.
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4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Parameter Estimates
The findings concerning the estimated parameters of the bivariate Probit sample
selection model are shown in Table 7. From the 1,243 defaulted firms only 886 are
considered in the estimation due to missing data. A total of 104 of the remaining
default events have a canceled relationship (rcit = 1) and 782 have a maintained
relationship (rcit = 0). Table 7 shows the final model. In addition, the relationship-
specific findings without sample correction are shown. The not-corrected model
parameters are estimated via a logistic regression with a Probit link function.
All parameters concerning the probability of sample selection are significant on
the 1% level. A positive value is estimated concerning the parameters of the Cur-
rent Liabilities to Total Capital, Long-term Liabilities to Total Capital, ln(Total
Capital) and the macroeconomic covariable 3-month EURIBOR. The positive value
indicates that higher values of the variables lead to a higher probability of selec-
tion. Hence, those variables have a negative influence on the survival probability of
the firms. The estimated parameters of the constant and the firm-specific covari-
ables ln(Sales), Gross Profit to Total Capital and Equity to Total Capital as well
the macroeconomic covariable growth rate of the German GDP turn out to have
a negative algebraic sign. A negative value indicates a lower selection probability
with higher values regarding the covariates. Hence, these variables have a positive
influence on the survival probability.
A quite high value concerning the Gross Profit to Total Capital indicates a dominant
market strategy and financial strength. If a firm’s Equity to Total Capital is on a
high level, it can face short-term loss situations without much effort. Furthermore,
it indicates a higher financial stability and leads to a better standing in loan ne-
gotiations. Regarding firms with high short- and long-term liability positions the
extension of the credit lines become more and more difficult due to reluctant lenders.
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Table 7: Estimation of the model parameters. Variant 1 contains the estimated
parameters concerning the probability for the selection and the estimated parameters
regarding the identified significant relationship-related variables. Variant 2 contains the
via logistic regression with a Probit link function estimated relationship-related
parameters without sample correction. (Std. Errors in parenthesis)
Covariate Variant 1 Variant 2
Selection Part Sample-Corrected Not-Sample-Corrected
Relationship Part
Constant -1.8148*** -5.7947*** -6.7705***
(0.1719) (0.6470) (0.9239)
ln(Sales) -0.0862***
(0.0126)
Gross Profit/ -0.4324***
Total Capital (0.0512)
Current Liabilities/ 0.5366***
Total Capital (0.1291)
Long-term Liabilities / 0.4681***
Total Capital (0.1351)
Equity / Total Capital -0.5663*** -0.8031*** 0.0296
(0.0995) (0.2147) (0.4153)
ln(Total Capital) 0.0540***
(0.0149)
GDP -0.3906*** -0.7060*** -0.8991***
(0.0320) (0.1373) (0.2304)
3-month EURIBOR 0.3135*** 1.1763*** 1.8646***
(0.0472) (0.2536) (0.3227)
Free-of-interest-state 2.4447*** 4.1931***
(0.3613) (0.3508)
Non-accrued -0.7135*** -1.1884***
(0.2428) (0.3721)
90-day-delayed- -0.9026*** -2.0201***
payment (0.3171) (0.3992)
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5% , ***significant at 1%
Hence, possible short-term opportunities cannot be realized with further credit. In
addition, the dependence concerning their borrowers is enhancing with the credit
lines and a loss situation can soon end up in insolvency. The covariables ln(Sales)
and ln(Total Capital) can be used as proxies for a firm’s size. The findings indicate,
that firms with higher sales have a lower default probability. This might be due to a
greater market share and more bargaining power. On the opposite side, the negative
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algebraic sign of the parameter ln(Total Assets) indicates that firms have a lower
survival probability with a higher amount of assets. A higher total asset position
might be attended by a lower flexibility. Those firms cannot react in time if changes
in important markets are developing and thus on average more often fail in these
situations. The parameter of the 3-month EURIBOR has a positive value, hence
a higher interest rate has a negative impact of a firm’s survival probability. If the
interest rates turn up the refinancing costs concerning new loans as well as loans on
variable interest basis are growing, too. If those costs cannot be compensated the
firm’s business model loses efficiency and a default becomes more likely. The growth
rate of the GDP has a significant positive influence on a firm’s survival probability.
The positive influence of the GDP can be explained by the fact, that in economic
upturns a lower number of firms fails due to the high market demand.
Regarding the relationship-cancelation-related parameter estimations one can see,
that the findings concerning the sample-corrected and the not-sample-corrected vari-
ant differ. Especially regarding the variable Equity to total Capital the differences
are obvious, because the not-sample-corrected model fails to identify this significant
variable. Hence, without correction, a sample selection bias is most likely. This
can be explained by the fact that relationship-related information is only observable
concerning the small fraction of defaulted firms. The influence of the not-defaulted
firms in the credit portfolio, which have a certain probability of default, is completely
missed by the logistic regression in the variant 2 in Table 7. The applied bivariate
sample selection method also incorporates the influence of the not-defaulted firms in
order to omit a sample selection bias, see Heckman (1976, 1979), Boyes et al. (1989)
and Greene (1998). Both methods identify the relationship-relevant variables Free-
of-interest state, Non-accrued, 90-day-delayed-payment, GDP and 3-month EURI-
BOR. The significance level of these parameters is at the 1% level in both divisions.
In addition, the parameter of the variable identified in the sample-corrected model
Equity to Total Capital is significant at the 1% level.
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It should be mentioned that regarding the relationship-cancelation-related evalua-
tion all variables concerning the credit amount have turned out to be not significant.
Hence, the stability of the relationship between a bank and its defaulted borrower
seems to be indifferent concerning the total credit exposure of the borrowing SME.
The significant variables create an interesting picture concerning the lenders behav-
ior regarding the relationship with its individual borrowers as well as the influence
of macroeconomic circumstances. The identified variable Free-of-interest state has
a significant strong positive influence on the probability for the cancelation of the
relationship. The estimated parameter is significant at the 1% level. Hence, if it is
obviously stated that the lender will not be paid any more interest for the outstand-
ing credits, this has a highly negative influence on the relationship between lender
and borrower.
If the payment is not completely canceled but only late for some time, indicated by
the negative parameters regarding the variables Non-accrued and 90-day-delayed-
payment, the relationship is not burdened much. Both parameters are significant
at the 1% level. The highest negative influence is found concerning the variable 90-
day-delayed-payment. The occurrence of delayed payments seems to be tolerated to
some extent concerning the bank’s SME portfolio.
Another relationship-supporting influence can be stated concerning the variable Eq-
uity to Total Capital. A high equity quote can be seen as a strong commitment of
the firm’s owner. High equity positions are not necessarily connected with liquidity.
Hence, a high Equity to Total Capital position seems more a positive signaling by
the owner, because equity itself cannot guarantee the payment of any bill. The
owner of the firm will most likely invest more energy in the support of the firm
when his equity share is high. The signaling enhances the trust between borrower
and lender and thus strengthens the cooperation. This might be the reason why
the bank tends to maintain the relationship more often if a firm’s equity position is
relative high.
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The macroeconomic environment is displayed in the model by the variables GDP
and 3-month EURIBOR. Regarding those variables both parameters are significant
at the 1% level. The GDP has a positive influence on the relationship. In an eco-
nomic upturn the relationship is more often maintained, which might be due to the
generally higher chances for all firms in the economy to prosper and thus return to
profitability and liquidity. A negative influence of the interest rate is indicated by
the high positive value of the parameter regarding the 3-month EURIBOR. Hence,
with higher interest rates the bank tends more often to cancel the relationship with
its defaulted SME borrower. Higher interest rates have two main effects on the re-
lationship: First, the firm faces higher refinancing costs and is probably not capable
of paying these additional interests when it is in an financial struggle. Hence, the
restructuring process is interrupted and the relationship becomes weaker. Second,
the bank’s opportunity costs, for example, regarding the delayed or not-paid interest
are growing. Hence, it becomes more reasonable to cancel the relationship, maybe
even with a loss, and invest the money in the capital market.
The findings indicate that the relationship between a major bank and an SME bor-
rower is most likely canceled if the bank is convinced that it will not get paid any
more for the outstanding loans. However, if the payment is only deferred for some
period of time and not completely stopped, the relationship cancelation is less likely.
The bank seems to accept that a borrower might sometimes be late concerning its
payments. In addition, a positive signaling by the firm’s owner as a risk taker,
indicated through a high equity involvement, further strengthens the relationship.
In general, a prosperous economy and low interest rates, which indicate a likable
turnaround of the defaulted firm, are a relationship-supporting environment. Hence,
the earning prospects for the bank regarding its loans to the individual SME as well
as risk-related facts seems to be essential for the robustness of the relationship.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper the robustness of the relationship between a major bank and an SME
borrower in a stressed situation is evaluated. A stressed situation is defined as
a situation in which the borrowing firm has triggered a default event. Different
qualitative and quantitative factors are evaluated concerning their influence on the
strength of the relationship. Based on SME credit portfolio data, a model is found
that incorporates the significant risk driving variables regarding the relationship.
We apply a bivariate Probit sample selection model for the estimation. The eval-
uated database contains 144 observed relationship cancelations as well as multi-
year data from balance sheets and profit and loss statements concerning a total
number of 5,930 German small and medium-sized firms and 1,243 triggered de-
fault events. A trigger for a default event is, for example, 90-day-delayed-payment,
Specific-provision or Bankruptcy.
We find out that the qualitative variables 90-day-delayed-payment and Non-accrued
have a significant negative effect regarding the probability of a relationship cancela-
tion while the variable Free-of-interest-state has a significant probability-enhancing
effect regarding the cancelation of the relationship. This indicates that delayed pay-
ments are tolerated by the bank while a complete cancelation of interest payments
is most likely followed by the cancelation of the relationship between the bank and
the borrowing firm. In addition, we find a significant, relationship-supporting in-
fluence concerning the firm-specific variable Equity to Total Capital. This variable
can be seen as proxy for the commitment of the owner regarding his firm. Hence, if
the owner has a high equity involvement regarding the defaulted firm, the bank is
inclined to maintain the relationship with its borrower. Finally, a significant macroe-
conomic influence can be stated by two variables. The economic growth, measured
by the variable German one-year GDP growth rate, has a significant relationship-
supporting influence, while the interest rate, measured by the variable 3-month
EURIBOR, has a contrary influence direction. The findings indicate that the re-
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lationship between a bank and an SME borrower retains its robustness in stressed
situations where a default trigger is observed as long as the bank gets paid for its
loans and the owner is a seriously involved risk taker. The relationship continuation
is further supported by a macroeconomic environment with low interests and high
economic growth rates. The findings can be applied by banks and borrowers for
a better understanding of their relationship and in order to gain benefits from the
relationship even in difficult situations.
93
References
Altman, E.I. (1968): Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and Prediction of
Corporate Bankruptcy. In: Journal of Finance. Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 589–609.
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (1995): Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small
Firm Finance. In: Journal of Business. Vol. 68, No. 3, p. 351–381.
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (1996): Universal banking and the future of small business
lending. In: A. Saunders and I. Walter (Edit.), Financial System Design: The
Case for Universal Banking. Irwin Publishing, Burr Ridge.
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (1998): The economics of small business finance: The roles
of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle.. In: Journal of
Banking & Finance. Vol. 22, p. 613–673.
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (2002): Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship
Lending: the Importance of Bank Organisational Structure. In: The Economic
Journal. Vol. 112, p. F32 – F53.
Berger, A. and Udell, G. (2006): A more complete conceptual framework for SME
finance. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 30, p. 2945–2966.
Berlin, M. (1996): For Better and For Worse: Three Lending Relationships. Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. (2000): Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?.
In: The Journal of Finance. Vol. 55, No. 2, p. 679–713.
Boyes, W.; Hoffman, D. and Low, S. (1989): An Econometric Analysis of the Bank
Credit Scoring Problem. In: Journal of Econometrics. Vol. 40, p. 3–14.
Brick, I. and Palia, D. (2007): Evidence of jointness in the term of relationship
lending. In: Journal of Financial Intermediation. Vol. 16, p. 452–476.
94
Dass, N. and Massa, M. (2011): The Impact of a Strong Bank-Firm Relationship
on the Borrowing Firm. In: The Review of Financial Studies. Vol. 24, No. 4, p.
1204–1260.
Degryse, H. and van Cayseele, P. (2000): Relationship Lending with a Bank-Based
System: Evidence from European Small Business Data. In: Journal of Financial
Intermediation. Vol. 9, p. 90–109.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2010): Ertragslage und Finanzierungsverha¨ltnisse deutscher
Unternehmen im Jahr 2008.
Duffie, D.; Saita, L. and Wang, K. (2007): Multi-period corporate default prediction
with stochastic covariates. In: Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 83, No. 3, p.
635–665.
Elsas, R. (2005): Empirical determinants of relationship lending. In: Journal of
Financial Intermediation. Vol. 14, p. 32–57.
Elsas, R. and Krahnen, J. (1998): Is relationship lending special? Evidence from
credit-file data in Germany. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 22, p. 1283–
1316.
Elyasiani, E. and Goldberg, L.G. (2004): Relationship lending: a survey of the
literature. In: Journal of Economics and Business. Vol. 56, p. 315–330.
Fama, E. (1985): What’s different about banks?. In: Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics. Vol. 15, p. 29–39.
Greene, W. (1998): Sample selection in credit-scoring models. In: Japan and the
World Economy. Vol. 10, p. 299–316.
Heckman, J.J. (1976): The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation,
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for
95
such Models. In: Anals of Economic and Social Measurement. Vol. 5, No. 4, p.
475–492.
Heckman, J.J. (1979): Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. In: Econo-
metrica. Vol. 47, No. 1, p. 153–161.
James, C. (1996): Bank Debt Restructurings and the Composition of Exchange
Offers in Financial Distress. In: Journal of Finance. Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 711–727.
James, C. and Wier, P. (1990): Borrowing relationships, intermediation, and the
cost of issuing public securities. In: Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 28, p.
149–171.
Jung, S. (2010): Ausgewa¨hlte Ergebnisse fu¨r kleine und mittelsta¨ndische Un-
ternehmen in Deutschland 2007. In: Statistisches Bundesamt - Wirtschaft und
Statistik. Vol. 1, p. 41–51.
La Torre, A.d.; Peria, M.S.M. and Schmuckler, S.L. (2010): Bank involvement with
SMEs: Beyond relationship lending. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 34,
p. 2280–2293.
Lee, E.; Eastwood, D. and Lee, J. (2004): A Sample Selection Model of Con-
sumer Adoption of Computer Banking. In: Journal of Financial Services Research.
Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 263–275.
Lehmann, E. and Neuberger, D. (2001): Do lending relationships matter? Evi-
dence from bank survey data in Germany. In: Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization. Vol. 45, p. 339–359.
Machauer, A. and Weber, M. (1998): Bank behavior based on internal credit ratings
of borrowers. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 22, p. 1355–1383.
Ohlson, J.A. (1980): Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of
Bankruptcy. In: Journal of Accounting Research. Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 109–131.
96
Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G. (1994): The Benefits of Lending Relationships:
Evidence from Small Business Data. In: Journal of Finance. Vol. 49, No. 1, p.
1367–1400.
Schenone, C. (2010): Lending Relationships and Information Rents: Do banks Ex-
ploit Their Information Advantages?. In: The Review of Financial Studies. Vol. 23,
No. 3, p. 1149–1199.
Sharpe, S.A. (1990): Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Con-
tracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships. In: Journal of Finance.
Vol. 45, No. 4, p. 1069–1087.
Stanton, K. (2002): Trends in relationship lending and factors affecting relationship
lending efficiency. In: Journal of Banking & Finance. Vol. 26, p. 127–152.
97
